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Notes
"IT'S (NOT) BAD, IT'S (NOT) BAD, YOU KNOW IT": THE
GROWING ACCEPTANCE OF THE "FAKE BAD SCALE"
I. INTRODUCTION
A Florida woman, presumably harboring visions of a lofty settlement,
walked into a local grocery store, secretly poured olive oil on the floor,
and staged a "slip and fall." 1 Without surveillance videotape of the inci-
dent, the store manager would have difficulty proving that the woman
faked the fall; the store could possibly incur thousands of dollars in court
and settlement costs in the process of resolving the issue of liability for the
woman's injuries. 2 Plaintiffs and their attorneys often embellish claims,
overstate damage estimates, and outright fake injuries, absent scientific
justification, in hopes that defendants will settle in order to avoid incur-
ring greater losses.3 For many years, employers involved in workers' com-
1. See Woman Caught on Tape Faking Slip and Fall, http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=ba9SlmstLa8 (last visited Apr. 1, 2009) (describing news segment of
woman faking "slip and fall" injury).
2. See id. (crediting $30,000 surveillance system as primary factor in avoiding
lawsuit). See generally Rudolph L. Rose, Reigning in Malingering & Fraud: Construc-
tion Responses to Workers' Compensation Leave, in PRAc. L. INST., INSURANCE LAW 1999:
UNDERSTANDING THE ABC's 365, 368 (1999) (discussing financial effects of malin-
gering). Malingering "costs employers millions of dollars in compensation bene-
fits every year." Id.
3. See Paul R. Lees-Haley et al., A Fake Bad Scale on the MMPI-2 for Personal
Injury Claimants, 68 PSYCHOL. REP. 203, 204 (1991) (theorizing that "[r]epre-
sentatives of litigants deliberately exaggerate damages rather than attempting to
present scientifically accurate assessments of plaintiffs damages"). Attorneys,
mindful that prosperous settlements may result from litigation, often use tactics
that make it difficult for defense attorneys to assess their case. See id. (stating that
"attorneys openly admit they 'ask more than [they] expect to get' in making their
demands, perhaps in part based on their belief that adversaries expect a negotiat-
ing process to ensue . . . [t]hey deliberately suppress clinically important data
which might interfere with their goals"); see also United States v. Kaplan, 490 F.3d
110, 115 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that one law firm, which had over three thousand
active cases, had client base consisting of sixty to seventy of malingerers, and within
which, five to ten percent of clients staged accidents); Steven I. Friedland, Law,
Science, and Malingering, 30 Ajuz. ST. L.J. 337, 339 (1998) (listing motivations driv-
ing personal injury litigants to feign illness and injury). With prospects of astro-
nomical payouts and settlements in personal injury cases, scores of overly litigious
plaintiffs, like the woman in the grocery store above, attempt to exploit the legal
system by exaggerating injury claims, ranging from personal injury to workers'
compensation. See, e.g., Tresa Baldas, Are They Faking It, orJust Flunking Test?, MiAmi
DAILY Bus. REV., Aug. 5, 2008, at 13 (citing case in which automobile accident
victim, accused of malingering, won $1.4 million personal injury verdict); Verdicts
& Settlements December 17, 2007: Collision at Red Light Causes Severe Brain Injury, LAW.
WKLY. (VA), Dec. 17, 2007, at 1 (discussing plaintiff, who suffered injuries resulting
(479)
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pensation suits, and others embroiled in personal injury litigation, lacked
efficient scientific means to detect malingering plaintiffs and feigned inju-
ries amongst compensation-seeking litigants-until now.
4
Through the use of the "Fake Bad Scale" (FBS), a forty-three question
True/False survey designed to detect malingering amongst plaintiffs, de-
fense attorneys now have an effective evidentiary tool to combat frivolous
injury claims. 5 Defense experts (typically psychologists) administer the
FBS survey to personal injury litigants during the pretrial phase-often
after suspicions arise that the plaintiff has faked the injury.6 If the plain-
tiffs responses on the FBS indicate malingering, the expert will testify on
behalf of the defense using the underlying science of the FBS data in an
effort to undermine the plaintiffs injury claims.
7
from traffic collision, and who scored conflicting results on test designed to distin-
guish exaggerating litigants, and yet ultimately settled with defendants for $3.5
million); see also Duckworth v. CSX World Crane, No. 07-60504466, 2008 WL
686576, at *1 (5th Cir. Mar. 12, 2008) (holding that plaintiff, who sought workers'
compensation, failed to prove prima facie case after plaintiff could not prove in-
jury occurred on worksite and testifying witness said plaintiff planned to fake injury
for pecuniary gain).
4. See Chantel S. Dearth et al., Detection of Feigned Head Injury Symptoms on the
MMPI-2 in Head Injured Patients and Community Controls, 20 ARCHIVES CLINIC.A
NEUROPSYCHOL. 95, 96 (2005) (noting that certain kinds of faking related to per-
sonal injury were, until recently, "undetectable"). With the creation of the Fake
Bad Scale (FBS), a validity test designed to "detect spurious symptoms in personal
injury lawsuits," faking is now easier to detect. See id. (stating that FBS "was more
sensitive to feigned physical problems than traditional MMPI-2 indicators"); see also
David Armstrong, Personality Check: Malingerer Test Roils Personal Injury Law; 'Fake
Bad Scale' Bars Real Victims, Its Critics Contend, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2008, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120466776681911325.html (noting reliance on
FBS greatly increased since 2006, after approval by Minnesota Multiphasic Person-
ality Inventory (MMPI), esteemed publisher of psychological tests). For a discus-
sion of the FBS generally, see infra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
5. See Armstrong, supra note 4 (discussing prevalence of FBS amongst psychol-
ogists). A recent survey by St. Louis University found that seventy-five percent of
neuropsychologists use the FBS to detect malingering. See id. (noting that many
neuropsychologists rely on FBS during their expert witnesses testimony); see also
Steve Rubenzer, Malingering of Psychiatric Problems, Brain Damage, Chronic Pain, and
Controversial Syndromes in a Personal Injury Context, 56 FDCC Q. 499 (2006) (discuss-
ing success of FBS). The FBS shows promise detecting malingering in a variety of
injuries including "feigned head injuries, chronic pain, mixed personal injury
claimants, and (in some studies) PTSD." See id. at 503 (noting that FBS is also
effective in forensic settings).
6. See, e.g., Forensic Psychologist, http://forensicpsychologist.blogspot.com/
2008/05/fake-bad-scale-lawyers-advocate.html (May 20, 2008) (noting FBS testing
occurs during pre-trial stage).
7. See Sylvia Hseih, Defense Experts Using Controversial 'Malingering' Test, LAWYAERs
USA, Apr. 2, 2008, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/legal/evidence
witnesses-expert/8956338-1.html (describing usage of FBS). Experts offer the FBS
as "evidence that plaintiffs are fabricating or exaggerating their pain or other med-
ical symptoms." See id. (quoting attorney stating that many psychologists believe
FBS "merits being used" in personal injury cases); see also Dorothy Sims, Cross-Exam-
ination of the Defendant Neurologist, Neuropsychologist, and Neuropsychiatrist, 2005 1
[Vol. 54: p. 479
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Since its inception in 1991, courts employed the FBS with ever-in-
creasing frequency, even as debate about the test's legitimacy waged on in
the academic world.8 Then, in 2006, the FBS was thrust to the legal fore-
front after the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), the
most widely used standardized personality test in both legal and non-legal
settings, added the FBS to its database of approved scoring materials.9
The MMPI's approval of the FBS gave the test credibility in the legal
ANN. 2005 ATLA-CLE 1323, 1323 (2005) (stating that "defense-oriented doctors"
use FBS to determine that plaintiff is malingering").
8. See, e.g., James N. Butcher et al., The Construct Validity of the Lees-Haley
Fake Bad Scale: Does this Scale Measure Somatic Malingering and Feigned Emotional Dis-
tress?, 18 ARCHIVES CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOL. 473, 473-85 (2003) (suggesting that
FBS results in false positives and incorrectly labels honest victims as "malingerers");
Jon D. Elhai et al., Cross-Validation of the MMPI-2 in Detecting Malingered Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder, 75J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 449, 449-63 (2000) (claiming that FBS
is not best predictor of PTSD amongst available validity scales); Grant L. Iverson et
al., Specificity of the MMPI-2 Fake Bad Scale as a Marker for Personal Injury Malingering,
90 PSYCHOL. REP. 131, 131-36 (2002) (arguing that suggested cutoff scores in FBS
are incorrect and create response bias amongst respondents). Though some aca-
demics argue that the FBS is inefficient, other studies tout its successes. See, e.g.,
Patricia Babin & Patricia Rogers-Gross, Traumatic Brain Injuy Wen Symptoms Don't
Add Up: Conversion and Malingering in the Rehabilitational Setting, 68 J. REHAB. 4, 4
(2002) (touting success of FBS in differentiating between litigants and non-liti-
gants); Eric F. Crawford et al., MMPI-2 Assessment of Malingered Emotional Distress
Related to a Workplace Injury: A Mixed Group Validation, 86J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT
217, 217-21 (2006) (declaring that FBS was lone measure, among all MMPI scales,
that produced significant correlation with respect to malingering and workplace
injuries); Glenn J. Larrabee, Detection of Symptom Exaggeration with the MMPI-2 in
Litigants with Malingered Neurocognitive Dysfunction, 17 CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLO-
cIST 54, 54-68 (2003) (finding that FBS was best test for detecting malingering of
neurocognitive deficit amongst litigants); Nathaniel W. Nelson et al., Meta-Analysis
of the MMPI-2 Fake Bad Scale: Utility in Forensic Practice, 20 CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLO-
GIST 39, 39-58 (2006) (suggesting that FBS performs as well as, if not better than,
any other validity scale, and may also be used in criminal setting); William T. Tsu-
shima & Vincent G. Tsushima, Comparison of the Fake Bad Scale and Other MMPI-2
Validity Scales with Personal Injuy Litigants, 8 ASSESSMENT 205, 205-12 (2001) (find-
ing that personal injury litigants scored higher on FBS than other victims).
9. See Press Release, Pearson Assessments, FBS (Symptom Validity) Scale Ad-
ded to MMPI-2 Standard Scoring Materials: Scale Helps Identify Non-Credible
Symptom Reporting (Aug. 2006), http://www.pearsonassessments.com/news/pr0
11107.htm (announcing addition of FBS to MMPI-2). A press release accompa-
nied the addition of the FBS to the MMPI-2, stating:
The University of Minnesota Press and Pearson Assessments announced
the addition of the FBS (Symptom Validity) Scale to the Minnesota Multi-
phasic Personality Inventory-2 standard scoring materials... The Univer-
sity of Minnesota Press, publisher of the MMPI-2 test, sought input from a
group of eight experts on the advisability of adding the FBS to the stan-
dard MMPI-2 test materials. A strong majority of these experts concluded
that empirical research has established the utility of the scale in identify-
ing potentially exaggerated claims of disability, primarily in the context of
forensic neuropsychological evaluations.
3
Chuk: It's (Not) Bad, It's (Not) Bad, You Know It: The Growing Acceptan
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2009
482 VILLANovA LAw REVIEw [Vol. 54: p. 479
world; since then, the FBS has captured the attention of many in the legal
community. 10
In a world where as many as forty percent of all personal injury cases
are exaggerated or outright faked, a tool capable of detecting malingering
amongst plaintiffs is invaluable.'1 Like many developments in the legal
field, however, the FBS has its drawbacks.' 2 Whereas defense attorneys
and scientists support the FBS as an effective tool for identifying "profit-
seeking" litigants, plaintiffs' attorneys argue that the FBS produces false
positives and is a biased tool designed to discredit truthful claims. 13 Fur-
ther, many plaintiffs' attorneys argue that the FBS does not satisfy the stan-
dards for expert testimony set forth in Frye v. United States14 and Daubert v.
Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals,15 and thus should be inadmissible in court.16
If the FBS meets the Frye and Daubert standards, the test is deemed "good
science" and will likely be used more often in court.1 7 If the FBS does not
10. See, e.g., Tresa Baldas, Polygraph Tests Gain Respectability in Court-No Lie,
BROWARD DAILY Bus. REv., July 23, 2008, at 11 (comparing different lie detection
techniques, including possibility of FBS as one method); Thomas B. Scheffey, Is the
Plaintiff Really Faking It? Controversial Psychological Test Claims to Identify Malingerers,
CONN. L. TRIB., Sept. 8, 2008, at 3 (discussing recent reactions to FBS); Dorothy
Sims, Biased? Call It Malingering, N.J. L. WKLY. Apr. 11, 2005, at 15 (criticizing FBS
for supposed unfair research methodology).
11. See Armstrong, supra note 4 (quoting estimate of Dr.John D. Griffith, who
stated malingerers make up forty percent of all personal injury litigants); see also
Paul R. Lees-Haley, MMPI-2 Base Rates for 492 Personal Injury Plaintiffs: Implications
and Challenges for Forensic Assessment, 53 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 745, 745-55 (1997)
(concluding that between twenty to thirty percent of personal injury litigants in
sample group feigned or exaggerated injuries).
12. For a discussion of the criticism surrounding FBS, see infra notes 73-76
and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Armstrong, supra note 4 (quoting both supporters and detractors
of FBS). Dr. Lees-Haley, the creator of the FBS, argues that empirical evidence
supports the effectiveness of the FBS. See id. (discussing Lees-Haley's response to
comments that FBS is "flawed"). One commentator criticizes the FBS, stating: "vir-
tually everyone is a malingerer according to th[e] scale." See id. (highlighting one
commentator's view that FBS shows "bias against women" and creates "'unaccept-
ably high' rate of false verdicts of malingering"). For a comparison of studies sup-
porting and criticizing the FBS, see infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
14. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (stating expert testimony rule).
15. 509 U.S. 579, 587-98 (1993) (examining standards and admissibility of ex-
pert testimony).
16. See, e.g., Brief for Plaintiff at *1, Reiner v. Warren Resort Hotels, 2008 WL
3992821 (D. Mont. 2008) (arguing FBS does not satisfy Daubert). Plaintiff claimed
FBS did not satisfy Daubert because:
1. The Fake Bad Scale pulls physical and psychiatric symptoms that legiti-
mate patients would endorse, and instead ascribes points towards malin-
gering ...
2. The Fake Bad Scale has a gender bias that is more likely to score wo-
men as malingering than men ...
3. The test has been excluded by other trial courts.
Id.
17. See Pamela J. Jensen, Note, Frye Versus Daubert: Practically the Same?, 87
MINN. L. RE'. 1579, 1581 (2003) (discussing Frye and Daubert standards). Under
4
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meet these standards, however, it will not survive plaintiff's Daubert or Frye
challenge, and the test and related expert evidence will be inadmissible in
the case in chief.18 Thus, malingerers who might otherwise have been
rooted out will be permitted to proceed.19
As the above ideological tug of war persists amongst scientists and
academics, courts are also divided with respect to the credibility of the
FBS.20 Some courts find the test has a valuable place in the courtroom;
others find that the ongoing scientific debate renders the FBS unfit for the
legal process. 21 For example, in 2007, a Florida court denied the admissi-
bility of the FBS because of the test's potential bias. 22 More recently in
S. T. v. KBR,23 an administrative judge cited the plaintiffs failing FBS score
Frye, expert testimony is admitted if it is "generally accepted." See id. at 1581-82
(detailing Frye standards). Daubert, however, uses four criteria, including general
acceptance. See id. at 1582-83 (discussing standards in Daubert). If the science is
admitted under Daubert or Frye, depending on which standard thejurisdiction uses,
this contributes, in part, to "decisions of admissibility for at least some types of
evidence." See id. at 1581 (discussing effect Frye and Daubert tests upon admissibility
of evidence); see alsoJames E. Ceicka et al., The New Gamboa Tales: A Critique, 12J.
LEGAL ECON. 61, 77-78 (2002) (stating "[t]he point behind the Daubert mandated
,gate keeping' role for federal judges is that expert testimony needs to be based on
good science").
18. See, e.g., Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 268 (2d
Cir. 2002) (excluding expert testimony following Daubert motion); Recent Devel-
opment, McQueen v.Jersani, M.D., 35 STETSON L. REv. 1117, 1119 (2006) (noting
that trial court's grant of defendant's Frye motion barred plaintiff's proffered ex-
pert testimony at trial level).
19. For a discussion of the FBS under Frye and Daubert standards, see infra
notes 161-209 and accompanying text.
20. See Baldas, supra note 10, at 1 (recognizing differing treatment courts give
to admissibility of FBS); cf. Cooper v. Jackson Recovery Ctrs., File No. 5007875 (IA
Workmen's Comp. Div. Feb. 23, 2005) (noting claimant's positive FBS score in
dismissal of workers' compensation claim); Spurgeon v. Barnhart, 2003 WL
25734676, at *5 (E.D. Mo. 2003) (listing positive FBS score as reason for denying
disability insurance benefits); Muhammad v. State, 46 S.W.3d 493 (Tex. App.
2001) (denying admission of expert testimony related to FBS).
21. Compare Armstrong, supra note 4 (discussing unpublished Florida case
where plaintiff scored failing FBS result but court did not admit expert testimony),
with S.T. v. KBR, Case No. 2007-LDA-11, 1 (A.L.J., Dep't of Labor Oct. 23, 2007),
http://www.oalj .dol.gov/Decisions/ALJ/LDA/2007/ST-vKBRGOVERNMENT_
OPERA_2007LDAOOO11 (OCT-23_2007)_081915_CADECSD. PDF (reasoning
that FBS' strong supporting research, validity of prior scientific research, and cred-
ibility of expert witness all contributed to dismissal of plaintiffs personal injury
claim).
22. See Brief for Plaintiff at *1, Davidson v. Strawberry Petroleum, 2007 WL
5084583 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2007) (granting plaintiffs motion to strike defense expert's
testimony because FBS is not supported by "hard medical science" and it is gener-
ally unreliable).
23. Case No. 2007-LDA-11, 1, 4 (A.L.J., Dep't of Labor Oct. 23, 2007), http://
www.oalj.dol.gov/Decisions/ALJ/LDA/2007/ST-vKBRGOVERNMENTOPER
A_2007LDAOOO1_(OCT 23-2007)_081915_CADECSD.PDF (discussing facts of
case).
5
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as a main consideration in dismissing the plaintiff's disability claim. 24 Be-
cause the FBS is relatively new, its admissibility under Frye and Daubert is
still undetermined in jurisdictions that use those standards.25 Although
the court in S. T. v. KBR did not employ either the Frye or Daubert standard,
the result of that case is nonetheless compelling because it is one of the
first decisions to discuss the scientific validity and admissibility of the FBS
in the courtroom.
26
This Note analyzes malingering in the courts, the history of the
MMPI, and the competing scientific stances regarding the FBS's effective-
ness. 27 Taking into account nearly twenty years of supporting studies, the
MMPI's endorsement of the research, and the rules of evidence that gov-
ern the FBS's admissibility, the FBS has a valuable place in the courtroom,
despite recent criticism.2 8 It is important to note that the FBS is not a
substitute for the adversarial system-judges and juries still have the final
say regarding the plaintiffs claim.29 Rather, the FBS is simply a tool that
helps enable litigators to detect malingering. Similar to other evidence,
the FBS can be challenged or distinguished.3 0 The FBS is not a panacea
for ridding the legal system of frivolous claims, but it is a step in the right
direction.
3 1
24. For a discussion of S.T. v. KBR, see infra notes 106-52 and accompanying
text.
25. For a discussion of the FBS under F7ye and Daubert standards, see infra
notes 161-209 and accompanying text.
26. See Franklin, supra note 6 (noting lack of judicial treatment given to FBS
and uncertainty regarding its admissibility under Frye and Daubert). See generally
KBR 2007-LDA-1 1 at 1-29 (dismissing plaintiff's claim without undertaking Frye
and Daubert analysis).
27. For a discussion of the history of the MMPI and FBS, see infra notes 52-70
and accompanying text.
28. For a discussion of the MMPI, see infra notes 52-62 and accompanying
text.
29. See, e.g., Simon A. Cole, Where Rubber Meets the Road: Thinking About Expert
Evidence as Expert Testimony, 52 VILL. L. REV. 803, 804 (2007) (noting that "[e]xpert
evidence can be combated like all other evidence"). Attorneys may cross examine
witnesses, may move to exclude irrelevant testimony, and may present evidence
that counters the debated evidence. See id. (listing acceptable tactics for attacking
expert testimony). Further, dictum from Daubert implies that methods combating
expert testimony are encouraged. See id. (noting that Daubert anticipated and pro-
moted use of such tactics). Even in cases where the FBS is admitted, the court is
not bound to accept its findings as truth. See Franklin, supra note 6 (illustrating
tactics plaintiff's attorneys can use to combat FBS). Attorneys can attempt to ex-
clude the evidence in an evidentiary hearing, or can forgo challenging admissibil-
ity of evidence and instead try to attack its credibility. See id. (same). One attorney
found success using the latter of the two methods. See id. (discussing attorney who
made FBS "centerpiece" and aggressively cross examined defense expert to gain
favorable jury verdict).
30. See Cole, supra note 29, at 804 (theorizing that, under Daubert, acceptable
methods for attacking adverse evidence apply).
31. See generally John E. Meyers et al., A Validity Index for the MMPI-2, 17
ARCHIVES CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOL. 157, 157-69 (2002) (concluding that litigants
score higher on FBS than non-litigants, and that FBS is effective tool for detecting
6
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Proper treatment of the FBS and malingering requires analysis of its
development and scientific evaluations.3 2 Part II of this Note discusses
malingering and its effect on the courts, the origins of the MMPI, and the
birth of the FBS.3 3 Next, Part III describes the scientific research behind
the FBS and the current debate in academia.3 4 Part IV discusses the facts
giving rise to the decision in S. T. v. KBR and the prevalence of the FBS in
the court's decision making-process.3 5 Part V examines, in light of scien-
tific research and the courts holding in S.T v. KBR, the FBS's ability to
satisfy the standards set forth in Frye and Daubert.3 6 Finally, Part VI ana-
lyzes the impact of the S. T. v. KBR decision and the effect the admissibility
of the FBS would have in curtailing malingering in the court system.3 7
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Way You Fake You Feel: The Problem of Malingering
Malingering is a serious problem in the United States' judicial sys-
tem.3 8 Personal injury cases are rife with extreme financial implications,
dependent on the success or failure of a plaintiffs injury claims, and such
personal injury plaintiffs often feign symptoms to gain favor.39 With so
malingering); see also Lees-Haley et al., supra note 3, at 204 (conceding that FBS is
not 100 percent effective).
32. For a discussion of the history of malingering and the FBS, see infra notes
38-70 and accompanying text.
33. For a discussion of the background of malingering, and the creation of
the MMPI and FBS, see infra notes 38-70 and accompanying text.
34. For a discussion of empirical studies of the FBS and surrounding contro-
versy, see infra notes 71-105 and accompanying text.
35. For a discussion of ST. v. KBR, see infra notes 106-52 and accompanying
text.
36. For a discussion of the FBS as applied under Frye and Daubert, see infra
notes 153-209 and accompanying text.
37. For a discussion of the FBS's potential impact in court, see infra notes 210-
18 and accompanying text.
38. See Friedland, supra note 3, at 339 (acknowledging that "[t] he problem of
malingering has weighed heavily on the American legal system"). When litigants
malinger, ancillary effects include "damaging the lives of [involved] individuals"
and threatening companies' "financial well being" because of unfair damage settle-
ments. See id. (highlighting effects of feigned injuries). Further, malingering ad-
versely affects the legal system by undermining public confidence and threatening
the system's credibility. See id. (explaining far reaching affects of malingering);
Lees-Haley et al., supra note 3, at 204 (emphasizing prevalence of malingering in
judicial system). Often, attorneys "deliberately coach" plaintiffs to be effective ma-
lingerers in order to increase the likelihood of the odds of winning the case for
their client. See Lees-Haley et al., supra note 3, at 204 (discussing malingering
generally).
39. See generally Fitzgerald v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 895 A.2d 405, 417-18 (N.J.
2006) (recognizing financial gain as possible motivation for malingering); see also
O'Donnell v. Barnhart, 318 F.3d 811, 818 (8th Cir. 2003) (recognizing thatjudges
may "discount a claimant's allegations if there is evidence that a claimant was a
malingerer or was exaggerating symptoms for financial gain"). Further,judges can
dismiss the claims if there is evidence that the plaintiff is malingering. See
20091 NOTE 485
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much at stake financially for both parties, malingering is often an unfortu-
nate end to the "by any means necessary" mantra in these cases.40 Before
a proper analysis of malingering can occur, a definition of malingering is
necessary.
4 1
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV),
the most relied upon handbook for psychological nomenclature, defines
malingering as "the intentional production of grossly exaggerated physical
or psychological symptoms, motivated by external incentives."' 4 2 Commen-
tators suggest three reasons why plaintiffs might malinger: anger at their
employer, avoidance of work, and monetary reasons.43 Despite varied
O'Donnell, 318 F.3d at 818 (providing judicial remedy for defendants in malinger-
ing cases); Treat v. McDonald's, 854 P.2d 393, 395 (Okla. Civ. App. 1993) (af-
firming finding of no damages where evidence in lower court indicated
malingering); see also Brownton v. Heckler, 571 F. Supp. 140, 244 (N.D. Cal. 1983)
(affirming expert's conclusion that plaintiff was malingering for monetary
reasons).
40. See S.T. v KBR, Case No. 2007-LDA-11, 1, 4 (A.L.J., Dep't of Labor Oct. 23,
2007), http://www.oalj.dol.gov/Decisions/ALJ/LDA/2007/ST v KBR GOVERN
MENTOPERA_2007LDA00011 (OCT_23_2007)_081915_CADECSD.PDF (theo-
rizing that claimant's earlier financial troubles and issues in personal life may have
triggered malingering tendencies). A testifying doctor hypothesized that this law-
suit may be a last resort of sorts for the claimant. See id. at 18-21 (discussing expert
witness testimony)
41. For a discussion of the definition of malingering and its effects on the
judicial system, see infra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
42. See DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed.
1994); see also Tam B. Tran, Using DSM-IV to Diagnose Mental Illness in Asian Ameri-
cans, 10J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 335, 336-40 (1999) (outlining DSM). The Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) is the most
comprehensive and researched manual of mental disability and is essentially a
handbook describing mental disorders and their diagnoses. See Tran, supra, at 336-
40 (explaining DSM). In the early twentieth century, a movement began amongst
psychologists seeking uniformity in the nomenclature of psychological diseases to
prevent misdiagnosis. See id. at 336 (describing reasons for DSM's emergence).
Though there were early efforts to create a uniform nomenclature, the American
Psychiatric Association established the Committee on Nomenclature and Statistics
and developed the first DSM in 1952. See id. (same). The DSM has undergone
revisions in response to criticisms, and the most recent revision occurred in 1994.
See id. (discussing revisions to DSM-IV). Today, an improved and heavily
researched DSM includes issues about "psychosocial and environmental problems
that influence diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis." See id. (outlining changes
made to DSM).
43. See Rose, supra note 2, at 368 (discussing plaintiff's motivations for malin-
gering); Jon D. Elhai et al., The Detection of Malingered Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
with MMPI-2 Fake Bad Indices, 8 ASSESSMENT 221, 222 (2001) (outlining malingering
motivations in PTSD litigants). Amongst PTSD litigants, motivations include: "fi-
nancial gain, treatment seeking, reduction of charges and sentencing." See Elhai,
supra, at 222 (same); Frank Sparadeo, Malingering Tests: What Are They, What Are
They Not, 2 ANN. 2004 ATLA-CLE 1, 2 (2004) (describing malingering as "deliber-
ate, conscious feigning of symptoms for an ulterior purpose (e.g. avoiding work,
receiving money, prolonging an illness with the intent to avoid a responsibility,
avoidance of punishment/prosecution or obtaining medications)"); see also Glenn
J. Larrabee, Exaggerated MMPI-2 Symptom Report in Personal Injury Litigants with Ma-
lingered Neurocognitive Deficit, 18 ARCHIVES CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOL. 673, 673 (2003)
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motivations among malingerers, one trait they share is a "deceitful state of
mind."44 Other psychologists suggest malingerers can exist at different
levels such as "pure" and "partial" malingering.4 5 Additional debate
amongst psychologists concerns whether malingering is a mental disease
or a conscious decision by those who are seeking to exploit others.
4 6
(outlining three ways in which malingering occurs in testing including: "(1) exag-
geration of symptomatic complaint, (2) intentionally poor performance on
neuropsychological testing, and (3) both exaggeration of complaint and intention-
ally poor performance").
44. See Friedland, supra note 3, at 339 (highlighting nefarious incentives com-
mon amongst malingerers); see also Rose, supra note 2, at 370 (arguing that malin-
gering goes underreported because "[m]alingering has a very negative
connotation, hence the reluctance to include the term in a medical report by any
medical professional"); Sparadeo, supra note 43, at 2 (noting that deceit associated
with malingering leaves negative stigma attached to "malingering" label). The de-
ceit associated with malingering "conjures up visions of slander and malpractice
lawsuits." See Rose, supra note 2, at 370 (explaining stigma associated with
malingering).
45. See Friedland, supra note 3, at 343 (discussing various levels of malinger-
ing). Differing levels of malingering include:
Dissimulation is the concealment or minimization of existing symptoms.
Pure malingering is the feigning of disease or disability when it does not
exist at all. Partial malingering is the conscious exaggeration of symp-
toms which do exist. False imputation is the ascribing of actual symptoms
to a cause consciously recognized to have no relationship to the
symptoms.
Id. Another researcher grades malingering and "defensiveness" in three degrees.
See CLINICAL ASSESSMENT OF MALINGERING AND DECEPTION 13 (Richard Rogers ed.,
Guilford Press 2d ed. 1997) (detailing degrees of malingering). Malingering can
result in one of three degrees. See id. (same). In "Mild Malingering," evidence
indicates that the plaintiff is malingering, but its effect is minimal amongst the
diagnosis. See id. (same). In "Moderate Malingering," the patient attempts to dis-
tort his diagnosis and appear "considerably more disturbed" than normal. See id.
(same). "Severe Malingerers" are "extreme in their fabrication to the point that
the presentation is fantastic or preposterous." See id. (same). Defensiveness is also
determined on the same Mild-Medium-Severe scales but involves the denial of se-
verity of certain medical problems rather than the exaggeration of symptoms. See
id. (describing defensiveness related to patients assessment of their own injuries).
46. Compare Friedland, supra note 3, at 343 (discussing debate about nomen-
clature of malingering), and Rogers, supra note 45, at 6-7 (discussing "pathogenic
model" of malingering which claims malingering is mental disability), with Toby
Zimbalist, Liar, Liar, Your Back's Not On Fire: A Request for Review of the Admissibility of
Expert Testimony on Malingering in Workers' Compensation Cases, ARIz. ArT'y, Apr.
1994, at 20 (arguing "'[mlalingering' is not a mental disorder, but a pattern of
behavior in which a person 'fake[s] or exaggerat[es] injury or illness in order to
get money or various other payoffs... [i]n common parlance it's called goldbrick-
ing or shamming'"). Medical opinions regarding malingering are varied:
Some experts in the medical community look at malingering as a type of
mental disease. Others believe '[t]here is a strange, entirely unfounded
superstition even among psychiatrists that if a man simulates insanity
there must be something mentally wrong with him in the first place' ...
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Within the judicial realm, it is often up to the judge and jurors to
determine the plaintiffs status as a malingerer. 47 Because discretion is
left to judges and juries to decide these issues, the legal system has inher-
ent buffers to prohibit malingering. 48 Tactics to discover malingering
have shown the most promise in workers' compensation and personal in-
jury cases. 4 9 Some states have even passed legislation to curtail malinger-
ing because it poses great problems in court.5 0 In addition to judicial
47. See Friedland, supra note 3, at 339 (noting process in which judges and
jurors analyze malingering). Generally, jurors' common sense dictates whether-
based on the available evidence-the plaintiff is malingering. See id. (same).
48. See id. at 344 (describing judicial "safeguards" in place to detect deceit).
Both parties may cross-examine witnesses, an invaluable tool used to "probe and
test the witness' assertions and to expose any inaccuracies that may exist in the
witness' factual statements, assumptions or inferences." See id. at 345 (describing
techniques available to attorneys at trial). Additionally, the opportunity to observe
a witness's demeanor provides an invaluable tool forjurors. See id. (same). Even
where expert witnesses are involved, such testimony is evidence rather than fact.
See id. at 382 (supporting notion that expert testimony is not, in itself, "truth").
Further, malingering evidence should typically supplement the jury's common
senses and provide helpfulness. See id. at 389 (discussing role of expert testimony);
see also David S. Caudill, Legal Ethics and Scientific Testimony: In Defense of Manufactur-
ing Uncertainty, Deconstructing Expertise and Other Trial Strategies, 52 VILL. L. REv. 953,
974 (2007) (concluding that trial attorneys can use same tactics to cast doubt on
evidence as expert witnesses). Prosecutors are not left without ways to counter the
FBS:
Trial attorneys can do the same thing, as one of the lawyering techniques
offered in trial advocacy training manuals is the "disagreement of ex-
perts" move:
Frequently you will have little ammunition to reduce the effectiveness of
the [opposing] expert's testimony. In these situations the best you can
realistically... achieve is to level the playing field. Show that the experts
on both sides are essentially equal and, in effect, cancel themselves out
... [t]his is always a useful approach whenever the other side's experts
are either more impressive or more numerous."
Caudill, supra, at 974 (citation omitted). For a discussion of Daubert and Frye as
additional legal "buffers" for adverse expert testimony, see infra notes 161-209 and
accompanying text.
49. See Friedland, supra note 3, at 380 (recognizing that "[t]estimony about
malingering has been very favorably received in the area of disability claims, most
notably in workers' compensation and personal injury cases . . . [t]hese actions
seek compensation for injuries, including difficult-to-detect neck, back and head
injuries"). See generally Paul A. Arbisi &James N. Butcher, Psychometric Perspectives on
Detection of Malingering of Pain: Use of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2,
20 CLINIcALJ. OF PAIN 383, 386 (2004) (recognizing effectiveness of MMPI scale in
detecting malingering in workers' compensation cases); Eric Y. Drogan, "When I
Said That I Was Lying, I Might Have Been Lying" The Phenomenon of Psychological Ma-
lingering, 25 MENTAL & P-rvslcAL DisAm'LTY L. RP. 711, 711 (2001) (highlighting
malingering in both criminal and workers' compensation contexts).
50. See, e.g., MD CODE ANN., LAB & EMPL. § 9-1106 (LexisNexis 2008) (creat-
ing penalty for malingerers). This reads, in part, "(a) A person may not knowingly
affect or knowingly attempt to affect the payment of compensation, fees, or ex-
penses under this title by means of a fraudulent representation." Id. The Labor
and Employment Code further states:
(a) Reimbursement. - In any administrative action before the Commis-
sion, if it is established by a preponderance of the evidence that a person
[Vol. 54: p. 479
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safeguards, malingering is detectable through various psychological tests
such as the MMPI.
5 1
B. Analyzing the "Man in the Mirror": History and Origins
of the MMPI Personality Test
The MMPI was originally published in 1943 by Starke Hathaway and
Charles McKinley as a tool intended to help psychologists and psychiatrists
detect personality disorders in patients. 52 The 550 multiple-choice-ques-
tion survey was originally designed to pinpoint emotional disturbances.
53
Each group with a specific disorder is tested against a control group to
find the response patterns for those with that specific disorder, thus mak-
ing it difficult to "cheat" the test.5 4 Today, the MMPI is by far the most
has knowingly obtained benefits under this title to which the person is
not entitled, the Commission shall order the person to reimburse the
insurer, self-insured employer, the Injured Workers' Insurance Fund, the
Uninsured Employers' Fund, or the Subsequent Injury Fund for the
amount of all benefits that the person knowingly obtained and to which
the person is not entitled.
(b) Interest. - An order of reimbursement required under subsection (a)
of this section shall include interest on the amount ordered to be reim-
bursed at a rate of 1.5% per month from the date the Commission noti-
fies the person of the amount to be reimbursed.
Id. § 9-310.1 (LexisNexis 2008). Other states have passed similar legislation. See,
e.g., 19 DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 19, § 2322 (2008) (protecting "employer against un-
reasonable charges and against possible malingering and fraudulent claims");
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-403 (2008) (creating penalties for malingering employees);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-38-125 (2008) (requiring that employers keep detailed
records to prevent employee malingering).
51. For a discussion of the MMPI, see infra notes 52-62 and accompanying
text.
52. See Tracy O'Connor Pennuto, Murder and the MMPI-2: The Necessity of
Knowledgeable Legal Professionals, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 349, 354 (2004) (recal-
ling that Hathaway and McKinley created MMPI because they sought "objective
means of assessing human psychology"); David P. Saccuzzo, Still Crazy After All These
Years: California's Peristent Use of the MMPI as Character Evidence in Criminal Cases, 33
U.S.F. L. REv. 379, 381 (1999) (describing MMPIs beginnings as test to determine
"mental disorders"); see also Nancy S. Erickson, Use of the MMPI-2 In Child Custody
Evaluations Involving Battered Women: What Does Psychological Research Tell Us?, 39
FAM. L. Q. 87 (2005) (discussing original intent of MMPI). The MMPI was created
to diagnose psychiatric patients and diagnose psychological disorders in military
personnel. See Erickson, supra, at 91 (same). In the 1930s and 1940s, at the time
the MMPI was created, the test was designed with the belief that each individual fit
into a distinct psychological category. See id. at 92 (discussing original intent of
MMPI database).
53. See Saccuzzo, supra note 52, at 381-82 (discussing formation of MMPI
question database). The MMPI questions are "self report" items related to one or
more scales designed to create a psychological profile of the defendant. See id.
(describing MMPI items).
54. See id. at 382. (describing testing of MMPI). The MMPI testing is done
through a criterion format. See id. (same). If a criterion group consists of 100
people, their responses to the MMPI are compared with a control group that does
not have that specific trait. See id. (same). Then, whichever unique outlier re-
sponses differ between the control and non-control group are placed on a scale.
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widely used personality test in legal settings.5 5 Both state and federal
courts use the MMPI extensively, primarily in litigation, to measure per-
sonality tendencies of litigants.
5 6
The successor to the MMPI, the MMPI-2, was published in 1989 to
remove some archaic nomenclature used in the 1940s. 57 The MMPI-2 re-
standardized the scales from the first MMPI. 58 Of all psychological assess-
ments, the MMPI-2 is the most researched and most tested. 59 Since its
inception, thousands of studies have verified the reliability and validity of
the MMPI and thus it has gained widespread approval within the psycho-
logical community. 60 Further, the MMPI-2's consistency is supported sta-
tistically through strong "reliability coefficients." 6 1 The MMPI has also
See id. (describing analysis of MMPI results). From there, the scale is developed
and testers compare new test-takers with the responses of the control and non-
control groups. See id. (describing usage of scale). If further correlation exists,
then one can hypothesize that those with similar answers to the disabled group
suffer from that ailment. See id. (recommending future utility of MMPI results).
55. See id. at 379 (stating that "'MMPI' is by far the most widely used in legal
as well as non-legal settings").
56. See, e.g., Bell v. Thompson, 545 U.S. 794, 794 (2005) (validating use of
MMPI profile confirming presence of "psychotic process"); Fautenberry v. Mitch-
ell, 515 F.3d 614, 614 (6th Cir. 2008) (admitting MMPI results to diagnose client's
mental state); Miller v. Springfield, 146 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that
someone whose MMPI results did not indicate disability could not sue under
Americans with Disabilities Act); United States v. Denny-Shaffer, 2 F.3d 999 (10th
Cir. 1993) (involving MMPI results as indicator of multiple personality disorder);
Wiley v. Epps, No. 2:OOCVI30-P-A 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13192, at *13 (N.D. Miss.
Feb. 26, 2007) (holding that MMPI is not prerequisite for Atkins hearing); United
States v. Battle, 235 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1307 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (approving MMPI and
stating that "[t]he MMPI is generally agreed to be difficult to cheat on without
getting caught"); People v. Cruz, 187 P.3d 970, 986 (Cal. 2008) (admitting MMPI
test results as evidence of lack psychopathic symptoms); Poliak v. Board of Psychol-
ogy, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 866 (Ct. App. 1997) (using MMPI to measure PTSD); Gay v.
Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 158 Cal. Rptr. 137 (Ct. App. 1979) (admitting use of
MMPI to assess emotional distress in workers' compensation claim); People v.
Boclair, 544 N.E.2d 715, 731-32 (Ill. 1989) (holding that MMPI should have been
cited before death sentence); Commonwealth v. Kappler, 625 N.E.2d 513, 514-15,
519 (Mass. 1993) (allowing use of MMPI as rebuttal evidence); State v. Locklear,
505 S.E.2d 277 (N.C. 1998) (allowing use of MMPI for psychological assessment of
defendant).
57. See Pennuto, supra note 52, at 355 (summarizing origins of MMPI-2). The
MMPI-2's predecessor, the MMPI, contained "out-dated and sexist language that
was common in the 1940's." See id. (discussing problems with original MMPI).
The MMPI-2 was created in part to remove this language and make the test more
easily understood. See id. (detailing revisions to MMPI-2).
58. See id. at 355 (describing changes made to original MMPI).
59. See id. at 356 (discussing prevalence of MMPI-2).
60. See id. (noting volume of MMPI-2 studies). Because so many studies were
conducted, "the reliability and validity of the MMPI-2 have been repeatedly estab-
lished." See id. (confirming credibility of MMPI-2).
61. See id. (stating that "'[r]eliability' refers to a test's 'ability to produce simi-
lar results when repeated measurements are made under identical conditions").
The MMPI-2's reliability coefficients, which are indicative of the ability to produce
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proved to be a successful test because it is heavily reviewed, reliable, effi-
cient, objective, and easily interpreted.
62
C. Stopping Smooth Criminals: The Development of the FBS
Recognizing the utility of the MMPI database, Dr. Paul R. Lees-Haley
created the FBS in 1991.63 In his article introducing the FBS, Lees-Haley
began by stressing the financial impact of malingering on the calculation
of claims. 64 Lees-Haley predicted that certain MMPI scoring items, when
isolated, could correctly distinguish malingerers from a control group.
65
He further studied a sample of medical outpatients because this group
would closely resemble those seeking treatment for "accidents, toxic expo-
sure, and stress on the job."
66
Lees-Haley claimed the FBS could identify behavior where the plain-
tiff was honest, exaggerating, faking, or hiding an injury.6 7 Within the
consistent results, are extremely high. See id. (describing reliability coefficients of
MMPI-2).
62. See id. at 368 (describing strengths of MMPI-2). There are many reasons
the MMPI-2 is accepted in courtrooms.
The reasons for using the MMPI-2 in court are abundant and varied.
These reasons mainly involve the ease of administration and scoring. Psy-
chological researchers have identified six main reasons for the wide appli-
cability of the MMPI-2 in forensic settings. First, the validity scales address
the credibility of the individual's test-taking attitudes. Second, the MMPI-
2 is interpreted objectively, using external, empirically based correlates.
Third, the MMPI-2 has high test-retest reliability, and fourth, it has high
inter-rater reliability. Fifth, the extensive research on the MMPI-2 is pub-
lished in peer-reviewed journals. Finally, the results of the MMPI-2 are
easy to communicate to non-psychologists, such as those involved in the
judicial process. Thus, researchers have found that the ease of communi-
cation of MMPI-2 results, along with its validity, objectivity, and reliability,
make it an ideal tool for use in forensic settings, such as the courts.
Id.
63. See generally Lees-Haley et al., supra note 3, at 203-10 (promoting benefits
of FBS).
64. See id. at 204 (discussing financial ramifications of malingering). For fur-
ther discussion of the financial impact of malingering, see supra note 3 and accom-
panying text.
65. See generally Meyers et al., supra note 31, at 158 (explaining rationale be-
hind selection of specific FBS items). The FBS testing questions "were chosen on a
rational basis" reflecting malingerers "response[s] specifically characterized by an
attempt to appear to be honest ... except for the impact of the alleged injury, and
to present the effects of the injury in a plausible manner." Id. (same).
66. See Lees-Haley et al., supra note 3, at 204 (noting that "purpose of this
study is to assess the potential utility of certain items on the MMPI-2 for discrimi-
nating claimants who are simulating or exaggerating emotional distress from
claimants who are not malingering").
67. See id. at 204-05 (suggesting traits that FBS can detect). The FBS can de-
tect various traits indicative of malingering:
These reports can be described as considered analogous to goal directed
behavior oriented towards ends such as: (1) to appear honest, (2) to ap-
pear psychologically normal except for the influence of the alleged cause
of the injury, (3) to avoid admitting pre-existing psychopathology (4)
2009] NOTE
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study, Lees-Haley developed a baseline cutoff score of twenty points to de-
tect when signs of malingering became evident.68 Following the study,
Lees-Haley claimed the test was a "promising procedure for the evaluation
of simulation and exaggeration of emotional distress ... [s] pecifically, the
Fake Bad Scale appears to differentiate personal injury malingerers and a
variety of types of personal injury simulators. '69 Lees-Haley predicted that
further research could verify these results.7 0
III. "HEAL THE [LEGAL] WORLD": EMPIRICAL STUDIES VALIDATE THE FBS
After its introduction in 1991, multiple studies evaluated the effective-
ness of the FBS. 7 1 Most FBS-related research supports its usage both in
the field of psychology and within the courtroom, in part, because it is a
likely predictor of exaggerated claims. 72 A small but passionate body of
research, however, criticizes the FBS.73 Critics claim the FBS produces
"false positive" scores and inappropriately labels as malingerers plaintiffs
with legitimate claims.74 Proponents of the FBS aggressively refuted meth-
where pre-existing complaints are known or suspected to have been dis-
closed to the examining clinician or likely to be disclosed tojudge or jury,
to attempt to minimize those complaints (5) to hide pre-injury behavior
which is antisocial or illegal or to minimize this if it appears that the be-
havior will be discovered independently, (6) to present an extent of in-
jury or disability within perceived limits of plausibility [these limits vary
widely], (7) and related ends. These tendencies appear among malinger-
ers as a group, but not all apply to every individual malingerer.
Id.
68. See id. at 206 (noting that cutoff score was chosen because it "most accu-
rately differentiated malingering and nonmalingering claimants"). The cutoff
point of twenty, however, is not meant to be a "hard and fast" line. See id. at 207
(explaining role of cutoff point).
69. See Lees-Haley et al., supra note 3, at 208-09 (supporting validity of FBS).
70. See id. at 209 (suggesting that further research was needed to validate pro-
ject results). For a discussion of subsequent testing of the FBS, see infra notes 71-
105 and accompanying text.
71. For a discussion of peer reviewed studies of FBS, see infra notes 71-105
and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Tsushima & Tsushima, supra note 8, at 205-12 (finding that per-
sonal injury litigants yield higher FBS scores than those who are not involved in
lawsuits). This distinction would prove to be valuable in court to distinguish plain-
tiffs whose sole goals are monetary from those with more legitimate motives. See id.
at 210 (finding FBS "more capable" than other MMPI scales to detect malinger-
ing); see also MichaelJ. Sharland & Jeffrey D. Gfeller, A Survey of Neuropsychologists'
Beliefs and Practices with Respect to the Assessment of Effort, 22 ARCHIVES CLINICAL
NEUROPSYCHOL. 213, 213-23 (2007) (recognizing FBS's potential utility in litigation
and suggesting that FBS could satisfy Frye motion).
73. For a discussion of criticisms of the FBS, see infra note 74 and accompany-
ing text.
74. See Butcher et al., supra note 8, at 473-85. (arguing FBS results produce in
too many false positives); see also Iverson et al., supra note 8, at 131-36 (investigating
specificity of FBS for identifying "negative response bias in personal injury claim-
ants"). The study found that revising the cutoff scores could result in fewer false
positives. See id. (suggesting revisions to FBS); see also Elhai et al., supra note 8, at
449-63 (suggesting FBS was not best predictor of PTSD amongst control group).
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odology underlying the adverse studies and remain steadfast in supporting
the FBS.75 Despite the wave of criticism, the overwhelming weight of re-
search is favorable to the FBS.
76
Research shows that the FBS demonstrates significant promise in de-
tecting malingering in a variety of fields. 77 Recent studies demonstrate
that the FBS is particularly effective in detecting malingering amongst
compensation-seeking plaintiffs. 7 8 In a study examining the FBS amongst
litigants with head injuries, one researcher compared the effectiveness of
the FBS to a number of other psychological tests. 79 The aforementioned
study concluded that the "FBS appears to be superior to the standard
Psychologists have also criticized the FBS in the media. See, e.g., Armstrong, supra
note 4 (recognizing one psychologist's disdain for FBS). One psychologist argues
that "virtually everyone is a malingerer according to this scale" and that the FBS
onlv benefits insurance companies defending claims. See id. (discussing criticism
of PBS).
75. See Paul R. Lees-Haley & David D. Fox, Commentary on Butcher, Arbisi, Atlis,
and McNulty (2003) on the Fake Bad Scale, 19 ARCHIVES OF CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOL.
333, 333-36 (2004) (arguing that Butcher's criticism of FBS used flawed data sets
that do not reflect groups who typically malinger, such as compensation-seeking
litigants); see also Armstrong, supra note 4 (discussing responses to studies criticiz-
ing FBS). Lees-Haley dismisses Butcher's study, noting that "Butcher's primary
strategies for criticizing the FBS is to apply it to groups for which it was never
intended, and then complain that it isn't appropriate. Of course not. The FBS
was designed for personal-injury claimants." See Armstrong, supra note 4 (defend-
ing FBS in light of negative treatment); see also Kevin W. Greve, Response to Butcher et
al., The Construct Validity of the Lees-Haley Fake Bad Scale, 19 ARCHIVES OF CLINICAL
NEUROPSYCHOL. 337, 337 (2004) (criticizing Butcher's interpretation of FBS data).
Another psychologist defended the FBS in light of Butcher's study, arguing that
Butcher's study lacked the criterion group methods that Lees-Haley's data con-
tained. See Greve, supra, at 337 (same). Without the same specificity as Lees-
Haley's original study, Butcher's claims of "false positives" lack solid foundation.
See id. (same). One psychologist noted that though the FBS detects malingering, it
does not, by itself, label the plaintiff as a malingerer. See id. (criticizing Butcher's
conclusions). Thus, a positive FBS score will not, absent other evidence, "further
traumatize" PTSD litigants, as Butcher suggests. See id. at 338 (same). When the
FBS is used in conjunction with other evidence, it is an effective tool in detecting
malingering and is "clearly supported by empirical research." See id. (affirming
utility of FBS in light of negative criticism).
76. See Press Release, Pearson Assessments, supra note 9 (adding FBS to
database of MMPI approved testing based upon weight of authority lending toward
its credibility).
77. See, e.g., Nathaniel W. Nelson et al., The MMPI-2 Fake Bad Scale: Concordance
and Specificity of True and Estimated Scores, 28 J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL NEUROP-
SYCHOL. 1, 1-12 (2006) (recognizing FBS's success in detecting malingering
amongst compensation-seeking litigants).
78. See M. Frank Greiffenstein et al., The Fake Bad Scale in Atypical and Severe
Closed Head Injury Litigants, 58J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1591, 1591 (2002) (recognizing
FBS's success specifically in detecting malingering amongst compensation-seeking
litigants).
79. See id. ("The correlational and diagnostic properties of Lees-Haley's
MMPI-2 Fake Bad Scale (FBS) were examined in litigating atypical minor, litigat-
ing moderate-severe, and non-litigating moderate-severe head injury samples.").
The study sought to distinguish the FBS from other scales in detecting malinger
among litigants. See id. (stating purpose of study).
2009] NOTE 493
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MMPI infrequency.., when litigation status is held constant," and touted
the FBS as a more "promising tool" than the widely approved traditional
MMPI scales.8 0 The study raised the possibility that the FBS could eventu-
ally gain the same widespread favor as the venerated MMPI.8 1
In a 2003 study, a variety of psychological scales, including the FBS,
were administered to a sample of thirty-three litigants.8 2 All of the previ-
ous participants in the study had exhibited behavior indicative of malin-
gering.83 According to the data collected, the FBS was significantly more
sensitive than other scales typically used to distinguish between exaggerat-
ing litigants and those that are honest.8 4 The study further concluded
that research criticizing the FBS did not distinguish patient groups from
compensation-seeking patients, and was thus inaccurate.8 5 In assessing
the "mounting evidence" in favor of the FBS, the 2003 study determined
that the supporting data and research was well-founded in light of the
study.
8 6
Another similar study examined MMPI profiles and compared all of
the MMPI validity scales for a large group of litigants. 87 Of all of the
scales, the study concluded that the FBS was the best validity scale for dis-
tinguishing compensation-seeking litigants from the clinical control
group.8 8 Though the research was confined only to personal injury liti-
gants, the researchers were encouraged by the FBS results, and suggested
that the FBS should be used in other areas such as Social Security fraud
claims.
89
80. Id. at 1598.
81. See generally id. (arguing that FBS is more useful than MMPI).
82. See Larrabee, supra note 43, at 673 (describing study's methodology).
83. See id. (describing history of test subjects). All participants had previously
failed psychological testing that indicated the subjects were likely malingerers. See
id. (same).
84. See id. at 680 (finding that "[t]he present investigation extends previous
findings in showing that the Lees-Haley FBS is more sensitive ... to the presence of
malingering in personal injury settings"). The study concluded by stating that
"[i]n closing, there is a growing body of research supporting the validity of the FBS
in detecting exaggeration of symptom report on the MMPI-2 in personal injury
litigants." Id. at 683.
85. See id. (arguing that research completed by Butcher et al., which criticized
the FBS, was incomplete because it did not differentiate compensation-seeking
groups from control group).
86. See id. at 674 (verifying that study further validated legitimacy of FBS).
87. See Tsushima & Tsushima, supra note 8, at 205-12 (examining forty-three
patients, across several validity measures including FBS, to determine which was
most effective in distinguishing malingering).
88. See id. at 208 (concluding that "results of the present investigation found
FBS scores to be significantly higher... and are consistent with past studies which
found that FBS scores to be higher among personal injury claimants as compared
with nonclaimants").
89. See id. at 210 (suggesting that FBS should be tested against "broader
range" of claims).
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Other studies tested the specificity of the FBS in detecting malinger-
ing.90 In one study that conducted "back testing" on "known malinger-
ers," the FBS correctly identified malingerers in eighty-six percent of
cases. 9 1 Much like the other studies, this study found that the FBS was
particularly effective in distinguishing malingering amongst compensa-
tion-seeking litigants.
92
Another study examined the effectiveness of a variety of MMPI scales
in detecting malingered emotional distress resulting from workplace inju-
ries.93 A group of twenty-seven students were tested as a control group
against a group of thirty-three patients. 9 4 Nearly every MMPI validity scale
proved ineffective at producing a correlation between malingering and
the test scores, except for one scale-the FBS.
9 5
In response to the large number of psychologists using FBS data, one
study sought to verify the methodology behind the FBS. 96 This study
sought to determine if the FBS data had a higher level of "specificity,"
which would mean the FBS was more effective than other MMPI indices.
97
Testing data suggested that the FBS was at least as good as the widely sup-
ported MMPI, if not better.
98
The wide body of research supporting the FBS has not gone unno-
ticed in the psychology community.9 9 Before the MMPI added the FBS to
its list of approved validity indices, the board reviewed the methodology
underlying the FBS with a panel of eight experts. 10 0 Because of the vast
90. See Meyers et al., supra note 31, at 157-69 (seeking to validate testing data
of FBS).
91. See id. at 157 (summarizing study's findings). The data showed that "[i]n
a group of knowledgeable actors (malingerers), 86% was correctly classified." See
id. (verifying data behind FBS). The study also affirmed findings of other studies
which stated that the MMPI-2 was particularly effective in detecting malingering
amongst litigants. See id. (finding that "this study suggest[s] that chronic pain pa-
tients in litigation produce a different profile on the MMPI-2 validity scales than do
non litigants").
92. See id. at 167 (concluding that study's results indicating that litigating pa-
tients show higher tendency to malinger builds upon earlier studies which indi-
cated similar result).
93. See Crawford et al., supra note 8, at 217-21 (studying which MMPI index
provided best method of detecting malingering amongst those injured at work).
94. See id. at 218 (discussing format of study). The control group was a group
of psychology students recruited from Pacific and Stanford graduate psychology
schools. See id. (same).
95. See id. at 220 (concluding that only "FBS proved to be effective in de-
tecting malingering despite simulators' familiarity with psychopathology").
96. See Nelson et al., supra note 77, at 1-12 (seeking to validate formula be-
hind scoring methodology of FBS).
97. See id. at 11 (discussing goals of study).
98. See id. (concluding that "both T-FBS and E-FBS scores appeared to show
specificities that were as good, and at times superior to, other commonly applied
MMPI-2 validity scales").
99. For a discussion of the FBS studies, see infra notes 71-98.
100. Press Release, Pearson Assessments, supra note 9 (announcing addition
of FBS to MMPI-2). The eight-member board voted to approve the MMPI, with a
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range of empirical research supporting the test's validity, the only change
the panel recommended was that the cutoff score be increased to twenty-
two-only two levels higher than Lees-Haley's recommendation from fif-
teen years earlier.
10 '
A minority of the board expressed concerns regarding the "false posi-
tives" associated with the test.10 2 The board assuaged these concerns by
noting the false positive rate for the FBS was not any higher than the other
already approved tests of the MMPI. 10 3 The panel's endorsement of the
FBS was the final push for the FBS, validating processes that psychologists
had touted for fifteen years. 10 4 The board's decision was important for
the legal community because it finally gave psychologists a reputable name
to attach to their testimony, which was already been well-grounded in em-
pirical studies.
10 5
IV. S.T. v. KBR: MALINGERERS ARE No LONGER "INVINCIBLE" IN COURT
A. Facts
Steven Thompson was an experienced truck driver, who had fallen
upon difficult times following his divorce and subsequent bankruptcy.' 0 6
six-to-two vote. See id. (discussing steps board undertook before including FBS in
MMPI database).
101. See id. (discussing MMPI approval). The panel concluded that:
[E]mpirical research has established the utility of the scale in identifying
potentially exaggerated claims of disability, primarily in the context of
forensic neuropsychological evaluations. They agreed that, as is the case
with all other MMPI-2 validity scales, scores on the FBS should be consid-
ered in the context of scores on the other validity scales, the circum-
stances of the assessment, and any conditions such as significant physical
injury or disease that could artificially elevate scores on the FBS.
Id. The former baseline level was twenty-this change was to increase the reliabil-
ity to an even higher percentage. See id. (justifying increase in baseline score).
102. See id. (discussing approval process). Butcher, the author of a contrary
study, was one of these members. See id. (summarizing board members
demographics).
103. See id. (comparing FBS to other MMPI-2 scales). The board pointed to
the FBS' error rate for scores indicating a strong chance of malingering, stating
"existing literature indicates that raw scores above 28 on the FBS are associated
with a very low false positive rate, which is consistent with the false positive rate of
other standard MMPI-2 validity scales." See id. (same).
104. For discussion validating empirical testing of FBS, see supra notes 71-98
and accompanying text.
105. For discussion validating empirical testing of FBS, see supra notes 71-98
and accompanying text.
106. See S.T. v. KBR, Case No. 2007-LDA-11, 1, 3 (A.L.J., Dep't of Labor Oct.
23, 2007), http://www.oalj.dol.gov/Decisions/ALJ/LDA/2007/STv _KBRGOV
ERNMENTOPERA_2007LDAOOOI 1(OCT-23-2007)_081915_CADECSD.PDF
(describing claimants testimonial evidence). Claimant drove trucks while serving
in the United States Army in Germany between 1981 and 1987. See id. (discussing
claimant's work history). After his discharge from the Army, Thompson attended
tractor-trailer school and drove for freight lines until 2004, when he decided to go
overseas. See id. (same). Claimant recognized that he had financial problems
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Lured by lofty salary opportunities overseas, Thompson applied to drive
trucks for KBR's Kuwait operation, a private convoy transporting military
equipment. 10 7 Only a few days after his arrival, KBR transferred Thomp-
son to Iraq as a driver in military convoys.
10 8
While in Iraq, Thompson delivered military supplies as part of a fif-
teen truck convoy located fifty miles north of Baghdad.10 9 For his services,
prior to his deployment. See id. (describing claimant deposition in which claimant
admitted "[h]e was also having child support issues after a divorce"). Thompson's
child support bill was $680.00 per month. See id. at 7 (describing Thompson's only
bill when he was deployed). Though Thompson denied "financial stress," the wit-
ness deposition of psychiatrist Dr. Harold Lilly indicated that he had met with
plaintiff with prior to plaintiff's departure from the country. See id. at 8 (outlining
doctor's witness deposition). Dr. Lilly recalled speaking with Thompson about
Thompson's financial stress, and stated that Thompson indicated he "went to Iraq
... to be able to pay his child support." See id. (describing meeting between Lilly
and Thompson). Though the visit appeared in Thompson's medical records,
Thompson contended the visit never took place. See id. (analyzing inconsistencies
in case). A therapist who met with Thompson in October 2005-after Thomp-
son's return from Iraq-reported that Thompson felt "trapped by his child sup-
port demands" and that "he originally went to Iraq because he could not keep up
with his child support." See id. at 11 (describing mental health evaluation from
Sandhills Center for Medical Health). Upon reviewing Thompson's file, Dr. John
Griffith confirmed that the plaintiff had visited with Behavioral Associates of
Asheboro for "financial [child support] problems which were psychological in na-
ture," before he had left the country. See id. at 17 (confirming Thompson's en-
counter with Dr. Lilly). Throughout the reported case, Thompson is not referred
to by name, but only as "Claimant" or his initials, "S.T." See id. at 1-29 (referring to
plaintiff only by his initials or as "Claimant"). Other news sources reporting this
case, however, reveal that the plaintiffs name is Steven Thompson. See, e.g., Arm-
strong, supra note 4 (referencing Thompson by name).
107. See KBR 2007-LDA-11 at 8 (describing Thompson's motivations for leav-
ing). Thompson "stated he went to Iraq because there was a lot of money to be
made." Id. A mental health clinic's evaluation noted that Thompson expected
"high income as a truck driver." See id. at 11. Thompson's weekly wage was
$1,860.88. See id. at 20 (describing salary structure of KBR). KBR, a former subsid-
iary of Halliburton, is the "nation's top Iraq war contractor" with 10,500 American
employees in Iraq. See Farah Stockman, Top Iraq Contractor Skirts US Taxes Offshore,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 6, 2008, available at http://www.boston.com/news/world/
articles/2008/03/06/top-iraq-contractor skirts us taxesoffshore/ (describing
KBR's overseas operation). KBR's operation was "tasked with delivering critical
supplies-ammunition, water, spare parts for tanks and military vehicles, fuel, and
medical supplies, among others-to the military throughout Iraq." NPR.org, KBR
Statement on Truck Drivers in Iraq (May 25, 2006), http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=5430625. KBR's convoys "consist[ ] of more
than 1,000 trucks that were brought in from all over the world in order to meet the
Army's urgent requirements." Id.
108. See KBR, 2007-LDA-11 at 4 (detailing case facts). Thompson was given
the choice between going to Iraq or "demobiliz[ing] back to the United States."
See id. (same).
109. See id. (discussing Thompson's duties). Thompson was stationed at
Camp Anaconda, a military base. See id. Thompson's duties consisted of driving
trucks "outside the wire." See id. "Outside the wire" is military jargon for "leaving
[Baghdad's] safety zone and traveling through the streets." See Laura T. Coffey,
Part 3: Venturing Outside the Wire in Baghdad, MSNBC, http://www.msnbc.msn.
com/id/19441091/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2008). After six months, Thompson was
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Thompson garnered a weekly wage of $1,860.88.110 During convoy mis-
sions, Thompson "received action" in the form of enemy activity on the
majority of his deliveries.1"' Although Thompson did not suffer any physi-
cal injuries, small arms fire broke his truck's windows on several occa-
sions.11 2 After a mission to recover damaged vehicles, Thompson decided
he had "had enough"; he returned to the United States soon thereafter."
1 3
Upon returning to the United States, Thompson claimed he could no
longer drive a truck and "did not know what the problem was." 1 14 At his
new jobs, Thompson struggled to maintain steady work, and later de-
scribed himself as "explosive" and suffering from temper problems.1 15 In
addition, Thompson experienced recurring nightmares regarding his ex-
periences in Iraq. 116 Thompson could not recall a single event that
caused his condition but said it was based on a "continuum" of events' 17
While home, Thompson visited the "American Contractors in Iraq" web-
again transferred, this time to Mosul, Iraq. See KBR 2007-LDA-1 1 at 4 (describing
case facts).
110. See id. at 20 (highlighting Thompson's compensation).
111. See id. at 4 (describing convoy missions). The missions occurred in the
evening because of the daytime heat and nighttime trips were less visible to attack-
ers. See id. Thompson's deposition claimed that there was "enemy activity on 50%
to 75% of the convoys." Id. Activity ranged from small incidents such as rocks
being thrown at the truck to detonation of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
See id. At the beginning of his deployment, the trucks Thompson drove were not
armored. See id.
112. See id. (describing nature of damage done trucks driven by claimant).
Thompson noted that he "had no physical damage done [to him] . . . in six
months there." Id. Thompson's vehicle, however, was damaged occasionally and
his windows were broken by small arms fire "on more than three occasions." See id.
Thompson recalled that during one incident an IED struck a convoy vehicle in
front of him and the explosion damaged his windshield; Thompson had to kick
out his windshield to see clearly. See id.
113. See id. at 5 (detailing Thompson's first mission in Mosul, Iraq). In No-
vember 2004, during a trip to recover damaged vehicles, Thompson encountered a
truck with a corpse inside it. See id. (describing Thompson's reasons for leaving
Iraq). As a result, Thompson took a temporary position as a bus driver on the
base, transporting other drivers around. See id. Thompson stated that "he felt
ashamed that he decided not to continue driving outside the wire." Id. Thompson
then demobilized and returned to the United States. See id.
114. See id. (describing Thompson's difficulties upon his return to United
States). Thompson tried to find work with a carpenter, but decided he was unable
get along with his boss. See id. (describing change in demeanor). Thompson also
believed his temper affected his relationship with his then-girlfriend. See id. (stat-
ing that Thompson was "having problems with . . . [his] girlfriend, with
everything").
115. See id. (tracking changes in Thompson's mood). Thompson later ob-
tained another job working for the City of Greensboro, but was fired for "discipli-
nary reasons." See id. at 6 (discussing Thompson's employment history).
116. See id. at 5 (describing Thompson's account of recurring nightmares that
"really freak[ed] [him] out").
117. See id. at 7 (stating that on cross examination "[Thompson] agreed the
best way to describe the basis of his claims is that it is based on a 'continuum of
events' from the time he arrived until he stopped driving outside of the wire").
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site, which offers assistance to contractors filing insurance claims.' 18 Be-
lieving he suffered from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD),
Thompson filed a claim for workers compensation in 2006, asking, among
other things, that KBR pay total disability payments equivalent to his
weekly wage in Iraq for the continuing future.1 19
A central point of contention in the case concerned other sources of
stress in Thompson's life. 120 A large body of testimony culled from the
depositions of medical professionals indicated that Thompson's condi-
tions might have originated from sources unrelated to his time in Iraq. t 2 1
Even before he had gone overseas, Thompson had acknowledged that he
118. See id. (noting Thompson's visit to PTSD website). Thompson claimed
the first time he heard the term PTSD was during a meeting with a doctor. See id.
at 6 (recalling Thompson's testimony). The "American Contractors in Iraq" web-
site, in its current form, prominently discusses PTSD. See American Contractors in
Iraq, http://www.americancontractorsiniraq.com (last visited Oct. 1, 2008) (offer-
ing services to contractors). It also contains a warning stating, "PTSD is like CAN-
CER, it's a hidden injury .... Just because you don't see it doesn't mean it doesn't
exists, and if not cought [sic] TREAT PTSD, don't let it go undiagnosed." Id.
119. See KBR, 2007-LDA-11 at 2-3 (outlining issues in case). Thompson
brought a "claim for benefits under the Defense Base Act... an extension of the
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act." Id. at 2. The Defense Base
Act covers injuries to military members and military contractors. See Defense Base
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1651 (2009) (outlining workers' compensation claims). Thomp-
son "contend[ed] that he sustained an occupational illness, PTSD, from the zone
of special danger while performing duties as a truck driver in Iraq." KBR, 2007-
LDA-11 at 20 (describing case facts). Thompson "argue[d] his average weekly
wage should be calculated using his actual earnings for the 28.714 weeks of em-
ployment for Employer in Iraq, yielding a weekly wage of $1,860.88 ... [and]
temporary total disability benefits from July 12, 2006 to present." Id.; see also De-
fense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1651 (outlining workers' compensation claims for inju-
ries to military members and military contractors).
120. See KBR, 2007-LDA-1 1 at 21 (outlining contentions of parties). Whereas
Thompson presented his claim of work related PTSD, KBR asserted that Thomp-
son "did not suffer any physical harm or injuries ... [and] the MMPI-2 suggests
Claimant is not suffering from PTSD but is malingering and exaggerating." Id.
121. See. id. at 11-20 (recognizing that Thompson's mental issues may have
arisen from a combination of factors, not simply his experience in Iraq). Thomp-
son was referred to Dr. Lilly in 2005, in part, because he was "upset about child
support problems." See id. at 11 (describing Thompson's reasons for visiting Dr.
Lilly). Dr. Lilly referred Thompson to the Sandhills Center for Mental Health. See
id. (discussing Thompson's mental history). The Sandhills Center reported that
Thompson has "child support problems and a lack of means to pay child support"
and "feels trapped by his child support demands." See id. (evaluating Thompson's
mental health). Additionally, Thompson told the Sandhills Center that he "origi-
nally went to Iraq because he could not keep up with his child support." See id. Dr.
Ezell Branham, after examining Thompson, believed Thompson's PTSD was par-
tially attributed to his military service in Germany. See id. at 15-16 (highlighting Dr.
Branham's diagnosis). Thompson told Dr. Griffith that he was not "troubled" by
his military service in Germany until he left for Iraq where it "reoccurred." See id.
at 17 (recognizing that mental health issues existed prior to deployment). Dr.
Griffith also noted that Thompson was seen in 2004 for "problems which were
psychological in nature." See id.
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was under stress resulting from his divorce and bankruptcy. 12 2 According
to his therapist, Thompson, who had difficulty maintaining his child sup-
port, had acknowledged that earning money was the primary reason that
he was going overseas.'
23
Prior to his departure, Thompson had met with a psychiatrist to dis-
cuss stress related to the burden of paying child support.124 Additionally,
Thompson, a veteran of the United States Army had been viciously as-
saulted when stationed in Germany in the early 1990s. 1 25 Thompson later
admitted that the event had affected his psyche for many years.
126
Thompson indicated to his psychiatrists that the assault in Germany con-
tinued to haunt him, especially after his return from Iraq.'
27
Of all the medical professionals Thompson encountered, only one
had tried to rule out malingering, which is necessary to the diagnosis of
PTSD. 128 Dr. John Griffith administered the FBS to Thompson after re-
viewing his inconsistent medical file. 129 Thompson's score of thirty-two
122. See id. at 8 (discussing 2004 visit with Dr. Lilly regarding Thompson's
financial situation prior to deployment). Dr. Lilly recalled Thompson that was
evaluated on a referral for "bad dreams and drinking (flashbacks) and being upset
about child support problems." Id. at 11. Thompson disputed that those visits had
occurred, and claimed any medical record reflecting the visit were "incorrect." See
id. (noting discrepancy between Thompson's testimony and medical reports). "He
also denied telling any physician that the reason he went to Iraq was to be able to
pay his child support." Id. at 8. Reports also indicated he may have been fired
from his position with the City of Greensboro after being questioned about child
support payment issues. See id. (attributing other problems to child support
issues).
123. See id. at 11 (discussing plaintiff's reasons for leaving country). Dr. Lilly
reported that "he originally went to Iraq because he could not keep up with his
child support payments," and because "there was a lot of money to be made." Id.
at 8 (noting discrepancy between Thompson's testimony and Dr. Lilly's reports).
124. For discussion of Thompson's clinical visits prior to his departure, see
supra notes 120-23.
125. See KBR, 2007-LDA-11 at 3 (reviewing Thompson's armed service
record).
126. See id. at 7 (referencing assault in Germany where Thompson was struck
in head). Thompson was attacked with a baseball bat; the event damaged his
psyche. See id. at 9 (describing assault and subsequent effects).
127. See id. at 24 (recounting report where Thompson told psychiatrist that
"his assault in Germany created a great deal of problems for him"). Thompson
told Dr. Griffith that this his time in Germany did not trouble him until he went to
Iraq, where it "reoccurred." See id. at 9 (highlighting Thompson's testimonial
account).
128. See id. at 25 (noting that only one doctor conducted malingering testing
upon plaintiff). Dr. Griffith testified that the DSM-IV requires "malingering be
ruled out for a diagnosis of PTSD when a court proceeding or secondary gain is in
issue." See id. at 18 (suggesting that other medical professionals who treated
Thompson erred by not conducting malingering testing).
129. See id. at 17 (discussing "red flags" in Thompson's file). First, Griffith
opined that it is atypical for PTSD patients to "discuss their situation on a regular
basis and interact with people where they re-visit the condition." Id. Thompson's
denial of past psychiatric problems was inconsistent with his visit to Behavioral
Associates of Asheboro in 2004 for psychological issues. See id. Further, Griffith
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was "practically off the score" and suggested malingering. 13 0 In Dr. Grif-
fith's opinion, Thompson's claim was motivated by pecuniary gain; the
doctor believed that any symptoms of PTSD that Thompson might have
experienced did not arise from Thompson's time in Iraq.
1 3 1
B. Judge Dismisses Claimant's "Off the Wall" Claims
The primary issue in S. T. v. KBR was whether Thompson had been
injured in the course of employment as required by Section 2(2) of the
Workers' Compensation Act (WCA).1 32 The Office of Administrative Law
Judges considered the testimony of both parties, as well as documentary
evidence and post-hearing briefs. 133 This narrative analysis examines the
testified that "the hallmark feature of PTSD is the traumatic event" and "[t] here is
no such this as cumulative PTSD." Id. (doubting Thompson's claim of "cumulative
PTSD"). In Griffith's opinion, the smells that Thompson reported had triggered
his PTSD were "not sufficient." See id. at 18 (discussing inconsistencies in Thomp-
son's file). Griffith noted that Thompson had gained weight in Iraq, whereas most
"patients with depression or under stress frequently lose weight." Id. Dr. Griffith
also indicated it is unusual for someone with PTSD to "inform[ ] bystanders" about
their stress because PTSD patients are usually "ashamed and do[ ] not want others
to know about their condition." Id. Thompson also did not exhibit "disorder,
disorientation, memory loss, delusions or hallucinations and was considered not
psychotic or brain damaged." Id. Lastly, Dr. Griffith deposed that, though repeti-
tive dreams are "concrete," they "do not 'count' as a bona fide symptom of PTSD."
See id. Dr. Griffith did not rule out the possibility that Thompson had "legitimate
problems," but opined it was unlikely they resulted from his employment in Iraq.
See id. at 19 (recognizing that diagnosis dismissing PTSD does not indicate individ-
ual is free from mental disorder). In fact, Dr. Griffith suggested Thompson "may
benefit from some therapy." See id. (stating further treatment may be
appropriate).
130. See id. (discussing FBS results). The FBS results were "practically off the
score," indicating that Thompson was malingering. See id. A second opinion of
the MMPI-2 results also supported "a finding of malingering symptom magnifica-
tion." Id. Dr. Griffith did not base his conclusion of malingering solely on the FBS
score; rather, the weight of evidence, coupled with the FBS results, informed that
conclusion. See id. at 28 (affirming that FBS is not sole tool in detecting malinger-
ing, but acts as supplement to affirm findings). The weight of the evidence, cou-
pled with the FBS results, led him to his conclusion. See id. (reiterating that FBS is
one of several "validity indices").
131. See id. at 19 (discussing Dr. Griffith's findings).
132. See Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 920 (2007) (describing re-
quirements in Workers' Compensation cases). Section 2(2) of the Workers' Com-
pensation Act (WCA) "defines 'injury' as 'accidental injury or death arising out of
or in the course of employment.'" See KBR 2007-LDA-1 1 at 22 (reciting Workers'
Compensation Act). Section 20(a) of the act requires a presumption favorable to
the claimant. See id. (same). Section 20 (a) of the WCA states:
In any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation
under this Act it shall be presumed, in absence of substantial evidence to
the contrary-that the claim comes within the provisions of this Act.
Id. at 22 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 920(a)).
133. See KBR 2007-LDA-1 1 at 2 (listing proffered evidence). For discussion of
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court's interpretation of the evidence proffered to determine if such an
injury occurred, including the FBS.1
3 4
Judge Lee Romero, Jr. prefaced his analysis by noting that the WCA
requires plaintiffs to show through affirmative proof that "(1) [the plain-
tiff] sustained physical or psychological harm or pain, and (2) ... condi-
tions existed at work, which could have caused the harm or pain."' 35 In
his discussion of the claimant's credibility, Judge Romero began by noting
the Claimant's "questionable" credibility. 13 6 The decision highlighted the
conflicting reports in Thompson's testimony and medical history.
13 7
Judge Romero conceded that Thompson was "undoubtedly exposed to
traumas," but found that "[Thompson's] embellishment and outright
fabrication of events to enhance his exposure" undermined Thompson's
credibility. 138 Though Thompson visited a variety of medical profession-
als, Judge Romero was "impressed" by Dr. Griffith's testimony. 13 9 Because
Dr. Griffith attempted to rule out malingering, as required by the DSM-1V,
Judge Romero found his opinion "more probative, reasoned and expli-
cated" than any other reporting clinician or physician involved in the
matter.
140
134. For discussion of the facts of S.7. v. KBR, see supra notes 106-31 and
accompanying text.
135. See KBR, 2007-LDA-11 at 22 (outlining elements of prima facie case).
Judge Romero also prefaced his analysis with section one, entitled "Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD)." See id. at 23 (discussing elements of PTSD). In this sec-
tion, Judge Romero defined PTSD. See id. (defining PTSD). Judge Romero ac-
knowledged that traumatic events can include "witnessed events." See id.
(describing PTSD). He concluded the section by stating that "[a] differential diag-
nosis requires that malingering be ruled out in those situations in which financial
remunerations, benefits eligibility and forensic determinations play a role." See id.
(acknowledging importance of malingering testing amongst compensation
seekers).
136. See id. (stating "[Thompson's] credibility in this matter is questionable").
137. See id. at 28 (discussing inconsistencies and contradictions in Thomp-
son's testimony). Thompson told Dr. Branham that his assault while enlisted in
the Army "created a great deal of problems for him and he was having difficulty
with dreams about the assault," but he provided contradicting history of the assault
to Dr. Griffith. See id. at 24 (same). Thompson also told Dr. Branham that a "kid-
ney stone episode" brought back experiences from his early 1990s military service.
See id. (same). Thompson also denied he visited with Dr. Lilly in 2004, despite
medical records indicating otherwise. See id. (same).
138. See id. (discussing Judge Romero's reasons for hesitating to believe
Thompson). Because of the inconsistencies in the record, Judge Romero stated he
was "generally not impressed with [Thompson's] efforts to exaggerate his expo-
sure to alleged trauma in Iraq." See id. (same).
139. See id. at 25 (highlighting Judge Romero's acceptance of Dr. Griffith's
testimony). Judge Romero described Dr. Griffith as an accepted expert and some-
one who was "highly credentialed and has held numerous academic positions." Id.
Judge Romero noted Dr. Griffith's experience in over 100 PTSD cases also contrib-
uted to his legitimacy. See id. (highlighting Dr. Griffith's experience). Dr. Grif-
fith's opinions were given "within reasonable medical probability based on his
interview of Thompson, a review of the medical records he provided, and indepen-
dent diagnostic testing." See id. (discussing Dr. Griffith's methodology).
140. See id. (supporting Dr. Griffith's methodology).
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In evaluating Thompson's prima facie case,Judge Romero found that
Thompson's exposure to trauma supported a "presumptive prima facie
case," but concluded that the weight of the evidence rebutted Thompson's
prima facie case.1 4 1 Under applicable administrative law, if the presump-
tion of the prima facie case is rebutted, the judge "must weigh all of the
evidence and resolve the causation issue based on the record as a
whole."142 Judge Romero, in analyzing "all the evidence," relied primarily
on Dr. Griffith's testimony highlighting the FBS.
1 43
Judge Romero recognized that inconsistencies in Thompson's case
made MMPI-2 testing and the FBS relevant. 144 The analysis of Thomp-
son's MMPI-2 score "contained indications of considerable dramatization
[and] exaggerating."' 45 Judge Romero specifically mentioned Thomp-
son's FBS score of thirty-two and cited a report stating "'scores of thirty or
more are extremely rare among patients not in litigation.'1 46 Though
Judge Romero recognized the FBS should not be "relied upon in isola-
tion," he nevertheless regarded the FBS score as particularly valuable in
conjunction with other evidence.
147
Judge Romero relied upon Dr. Griffith's opinion more than other
professionals because the expert opinion was "based upon both subjective
and objective criteria. 1 48 Dr. Griffith's use of the MMPI-2 testing and the
FBS combined to created a "reasoned" analysis, whereas others only used
141. See id. (weighing all evidence). Judge Romero referenced the attacks on
Thompson's vehicle, recovery missions, and diagnoses of medical professionals as
sufficient evidence of the necessary physical or psychological harm element of a
prima facie case. See id. at 25-26 (establishing that plaintiff suffered harm prior to
last day of work).
142. See id. at 28 (discussing administrative law standards).
143. See id. (weighing all evidence). Judge Romero devoted an entire para-
graph to MMPI-2 and FBS testing. See id. (discussing FBS and subsequent testing
verifying results). Further, nearly all ofJudge Romero's analysis related to Dr. Grif-
fith's testimony. See id. at 28-29 (weighing all evidence). Judge Romero again
noted that Dr. Griffith was the only physician or clinician to perform any objective
testing. See id. (distinguishing Dr. Griffith from other clinicians). Because the
DSM-IV requires testing of malingering before a diagnosis of PTSD, Judge Romero
valued the FBS analysis. See id. at 29 (stating that Dr. Griffith's criteria was "more
reasoned and probative").
144. See id. at 28 (noting that Thompson's profile contained "indications of
considerable dramatization, exaggeration, or faking"). The FBS score further veri-
fied Thompson was malingering. See id. (discussing Thompson's high FBS score).
145. See id. (discussing analysis of FBS score).
146. See id. (citing Dr. Rubenzer's report which analyzed Thompson's FBS
test). Dr. Rubenzer stated that Thompson's behavior could not "be taken at face
value." See id. (describing FBS conclusions).
147. See id. (discussing FBS conclusions along with other evidence). Judge
Romero determined "the record as a whole support[ed] Dr. Griffith's conclusion
and opinion that Claimant was malingering and [did] not suffer from PTSD or any
other work-related psychological condition." See id. at 29 (implying that FBS was
not sole reason for dismissing case).
148. See id. (noting indicia of reliability in Dr. Griffith's testimony).
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subjective criteria.1 49 Judge Romero concluded that "the record as a
whole supports Dr. Griffith's conclusion and opinion that [Thompson]
was malingering."1 50 Therefore, in weighing "the record as a whole,"
Judge Romero determined Thompson did not satisfy his burden of proof
that he suffered from PTSD "or any other psychological condition as a
result of his employment" with KBR.' 5 1 Thus, Thompson's claim was held
to be without merit and was dismissed.'
52
V. "EASE ON DOWN THE ROAD": WHAT DOES S. T. v. KBR
MEAN FOR THE FBS?
Judge Romero's reliance on the FBS in S. T. v. KBR acts as a warning
sign for malingering plaintiffs. 153 Though an administrative court's analy-
sis of expert witnesses and testimony differs from common law civil courts,
the methodology readily translates. 154 Further, Judge Romero's analysis
of Dr. Griffith's expert testimony is an important indicator that the FBS, if
subject to Frye and Daubert motions, will be admissible in court.1 55 If this
holds true, defendants can rest assured knowing that a reliable source is
available to root out malingering plaintiffs.' 5
6
Plaintiffs lawyers argue that the FBS has no place in our legal sys-
tem. 15 7 Though S.T. v. KBR is one of the only cases, if not the only case,
to heavily rely on the FBS in reaching ajudicial opinion, the FBS has been
cited in other cases.' 58 Thus, despite its relative youth, recent decisions
149. See id. at 28-29 (comparing Dr. Griffith's methodology to that of other
clinicians).
150. Id. at 29. For discussion of the weight of evidence, see supra notes 106-31
and accompanying text.
151. See id. (citing Office of Workers' Comp. Programs v. Greenwich Collier-
ies, 512 U.S. 267 (1994)). Greenwich held that when a presumption of a prima facie
case under Section 20 of the Workers' Compensation Act is successfully rebutted,
an administrative law judge can dismiss the case. See Greenwich, 512 U.S. at 280
(discussing case holding).
152. See KBR 2007-LDA-11 at 29 (dismissing Thompson's claim).
153. For discussion of the facts and holding of S.T. v. KBR, see supra notes
106-31 and accompanying text.
154. See KBR 2007-LDA-11 at 1-29 (discussing standards used in administra-
tive law). Conversely, expert testimony is governed by Fye and Daubert. See, e.g.,
Pennuto, supra note 52, 368-74 (outlining evidentiary standards for expert testi-
mony in both Frye and Daubert jurisdictions). Judge Romero's analysis, however,
considered many of the factors relevant in both Frye and Daubert. See KBR, 2007-
LDA-11 at 1-29. (discussing reasons for dismissing claimant's case).
155. For discussion of FBS as related to the standards for expert witnesses in
Daubert and Frye, see infra notes 161-209 and accompanying test.
156. For discussion of the impact of S.T. v. KBR, see infra notes 210-18 and
accompanying text.
157. For a discussion of the criticisms of FBS, see supra notes 73-76 and ac-
companying text.
158. See, e.g., Reiner v. Warren Resort Hotels, Inc., No. 06-173-M-DWM, 2008
WL 5120682, at *14, (D. Mont. Oct. 1, 2008) (recognizing FBS and FBS test results
as "valid"). The court considered Plaintiff's contentions highlighting the contro-
versy around the FBS, but determined that expert testimony regarding the FBS,
504 [Vol. 54: p. 479
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illustrate a willingness to allow the FBS in court.1 59 Additionally, the FBS
carries the endorsement of the MMPI, which brings instant credibility in
court. 160
A. "Give in to Me": FBS Under Frye and Daubert
Presumably, the FBS will be introduced with expert testimony. 16 1 Ex-
pert testimony is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which has a
fairly liberal admissibility requirement. 162 Though states are not bound by
when considered in context with other indicators, should not be excluded. See id.
at *15 (considering merits of FBS related expert testimony). Further, the court
noted that the FBS "is recognized as valid within the neuropsychology profession.
While the test is controversial, Plaintiff can argue the weight of the evidence to the
jury." See id. (admitting expert testimony in case-in-chief); see also Nejo v. Tamaroff
Buick Honda Isuzu Nissan, No. 02-1794, 2004 WL 346036, at *4 (6th Cir. Feb. 23,
2004) (recognizing Plaintiff scored highly on FBS, which is used to "ascertain ma-
lingering"); Carovski v. Jordan, No. 06CV716S, 2008 WL 1805813, at *1 (W.D.N.Y.
Apr. 18, 2008) (noting defense experts administered FBS to Plaintiff); Eubanks v.
Astrue, No. 03-427-WDS, 2008 WL 515001, at *6 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 2008) (discuss-
ing expert testimony about Plaintiff's FBS results); Adams v. Astrue, No. 06-5132-
CV-S-JCE-SSA, 2008 WL 508683, at * 8 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 21, 2008) (discussing FBS
testing of plaintiff); Cummins v. Unumprovident Ins. Co., No. 04-339-A, 2007 WL
4104275, at * 11 (M.D. La. Nov. 15, 2007) (detailing Plaintiff's FBS score of thirty-
five); Contreras v. United States, No. 1:03-CV-360, 2004 WL 3457632, at *7 (W.D.
Mich. Oct. 26, 2004) (recalling expert testimony regarding plaintiff's FBS score
which was "indicative of a person involved in litigation and seeking financial
gain"); Spurgeon v. Barnhart, No. 2:02 CV 29 DDN, 2003 WL 25734676, at *5
(E.D. Mo. Sept. 16, 2003) (discussing expert opinion that plaintiff produced "fake
bad" profile); Sochor v. State, 883 So.2d 766, 779 (Fla. 2004) (highlighting expert
testimony interpreting Plaintiff's FBS results which indicated plaintiff "possibly was
'malinginering"'); Posey v. Singletary, 795 So.2d 1249, 1259 (La. App. 2001) (high-
lighting expert's testimony about plaintiff's FBS score); Muhammad v. State, 46
S.W.3d 493, 508 (Tex. App. 2001) (discussing FBS and MMPI-2 testing).
159. For a discussion of the development of the FBS, see supra notes 71-105
and accompanying text.
160. See Armstrong, supra note 4 (noting MMPI approval of FBS). Further,
the MMPI has passed Daubert motions. See, e.g., Chrissafis v. Continental Airlines,
No. 95 C 5080, 1997 WL 534874, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 1997) (stating that "it
appears that the MMPI-2 satisfies the requirements of Daubert"); see also Pennuto,
supra note 52, at 375 ("Challenges to the admissibility of the MMPI-2 will rarely
prove successful, however, as the MMPI-2 fares well against Daubert's four criteria
due to the development and research literature of the MMPI-2.").
161. See e.g., S.T. v. KBR, Case No. 2007-LDA-11, 1, 28-29 (A.L.J., Dep't of
Labor Oct. 23, 2007), http://www.oalj.dol.gov/Decisions/ALJ/LDA/2007/ST-v-
KBRGOVERNMENTOPERA_2007LDAOOO11_(OCT_23_2007)_081915_CADEC
_SD.PDF (discussing FBS and expert testimony); see also Armstrong, supra note 4
(noting that FBS is presented in expert testimony).
162. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 80 F.3d 777, 782 (3d Cir. 1996)
(noting liberal admissions policy of Rule 702); see also M. Neil Browne & Ronda R.
Harrison-Spoerl, Putting Expert Testimony in its Epistemological Place: What Predictions
of Dangerousness in Court Can Teach Us, 91 MARQ. L. REv. 1119, 1146 (2008) (stating
that " [t] he [Federal] Rules are considered more liberal than the Frye test"); Anne
B. Poulin, Credibility: A Fair Subject for Expert Testimony , 59 FLA. L. REv. 991, 999
(2007) (stating "the [Federal] Rules liberalized admissibility").
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federal rules, many states employ either Frye or Daubert standards. 16 1 Al-
though a thorough analysis of the intricacies in Frye and Daubert is outside
the purview of this Note, a general application of these tests is
necessary. 
1 6 4
Frye simply requires that the science presented in court be "generally
accepted" by the relevant scientific community. 165 One commentator sug-
gests this means use must be "widespread, prevalent, extensive though not
universal.' 66 The general acceptance test, however, created a confusing
and convoluted body of law and in response, Congress adopted the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, which were considered even more liberal than the
Frye standard.1
67
In Daubert, which rejected the Frye standard at the federal level, the
court envisioned judges as "gatekeepers" who had the power to ensure the
reliability of testimony, and thus created a more stringent standard than
Frye or Federal Rule of Evidence 702.168 Daubert calls for a two pronged
163. See Pennuto, supra note 52, at 373 ("Although state courts are not bound
by the federal rules, most states follow either the Federal Rules of Evidence or the
Frye test [or] a variation of the Daubert or Frye test.") (footnote omitted).
164. For an application of Frye and Daubert to the FBS, see infra notes 176-209
and accompanying text.
165. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (discussing
standard of admissibility of expert testimony). Frye requires that the science in
question be "sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the par-
ticular field in which it belongs." Id. Frye required that "the technique underlying
scientific evidence must be generally accepted by the scientific community to be
eligible for admissibility [and] [e]xpert opinion based on methodology diverging
from authoritatively recognized practices in the field could not be accepted as reli-
able." Friedland, supra note 3, at 346 (discussing evidentiary standard in Frye). Frye
initially "applied only to the admissibility of polygraph evidence, but was expanded
by courts to apply to all novel scientific evidence." Id.
166. See Alan W. Tamarelli,Jr., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals: Push-
ing the Limits of Scientific Reliability-The Questionable Wisdom of Abandoning the Peer
Review Standard for Admitting Expert Testimony, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1175, 1186-87
(1994) (discussing meaning of "general acceptance"). States that use Frye include
New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Florida, Alabama, Illinois, Michigan, Minne-
sota, North Dakota, Kansas, Arizona, California, Washington, and Hawaii. See Shar-
land & Gfeller, supra note 72, at 221 (listing states employing Frye standard).
167. See Browne & Harrison-Spoerl, supra note 162, at 1143 (noting that "con-
fusion precipitated by the Frye standard was remarkable," thus leading to creation
of Federal Rules of Evidence). The Federal Rules of Evidence "specifically ad-
dressed the admissibility of expert testimony" and "eliminate [ed] some of the bar-
riers to the admission of expert testimony." Id. at 1144; see also Saccuzzo, supra
note 52, at 385 (stating that "Supreme Court finally resolved the F.R.E./Frye con-
troversy in 1993 in Daubert").
168. SeeJessica D. Gabel & Margaret D. Wilkinson, Good Science Gone Bad: How
the Criminal Justice System Can Redress the Impact of Flawed Forensics, 59 HASTINGS L.J.
1001, 1002 (2008) (discussing "gatekeeper" function in Daubert). Daubert requires
the "judge act[ ] as a 'gatekeeper' and may admit scientific evidence as long as it is
both 'relevant' and 'reliable.'" Id. In Daubert, the Court stated "the Frye test was
superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence" and thus a new
standard was needed. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 587
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analysis under Rule 702.169 In the first prong, judges must evaluate
whether the testimony is "relevant to the task at hand."17 0 In the second
prong, the reliability inquiry, the judge must determine if the testimony
reflects "scientific knowledge . . . derived by the scientific method."'
71
The court did not create a "definitive checklist or test"; rather, the court
cited several factors for judges to consider when determining if the expert
testimony is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, including: (1)
"whether the theory can be (and has been) tested"; (2) "whether it has
been subjected to peer review and publication"; (3) "the known or poten-
tial error rate"; and (4) "whether it has gained widespread acceptance
within a relevant scientific community."
1 72
The FBS likely passes evidentiary muster under an application of the
Daubert, Fye, and Federal Rule of Evidence 702 factors. 1 73 The list of
Daubert factors is not "exhaustive" and does not require completion of all
four factors. 174 The FBS however, goes above and beyond, satisfying all
four factors. 1
75
Under the first nonexclusive factor of Daubert, the methodology must
be "testable." 176 As previously mentioned, the FBS was subject to over
twenty years of scientific testing in academia. 177 The FBS's criterion test-
(1993) (discussing status of evidentiary standards following enactment of Federal
Rules of Evidence).
169. See FRANK J. VANDALL ET AL., TORTS: CASES AND PROBLEMS 751 (2d ed.
2003) (discussing Daubert ruling). Whereas Frye requires a "simple" analysis,
Daubert calls for a "difficult two-part analysis." See Mark S. Brodin, Behavioral Science
Evidence in the Age of Daubert: Reflections of a Skeptic, 73 U. CIN. L. REv. 867, 875
(2005) (detailing Daubert's two-pronged analysis).
170. See VANDALL ET. AL., supra note 169, at 751 (quoting Daubert's first
prong). The first prong means that proffered evidence must "logically advance [
a material aspect of the proposing party's case." See Brodin, supra note 169, at 875
(explaining first prong of Daubert).
171. See VANDALL ET. AL., supra note 169, at 751 (quoting Daubert's second
prong). The second prong of Daubert is also known as the "fit" requirement. See
Brodin, supra note 169, at 875 (explaining second prong of Daubert).
172. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94 (creating four factors that federal judges
should consider in determining admissibility of expert testimony); see also Kumho
Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149-50 (1999) (recalling Daubert factors).
173. For an application of Daubert and Fye to FBS, see infra notes 176-209 and
accompanying text.
174. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-95 (discussing four non-determinative Daubert
criteria).
175. For an application of Daubert and Frye to FBS, see infra notes 176-209 and
accompanying text.
176. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 (discussing first criterion). Daubert considers
both past and future testing. See VANDALL ET AL., supra note 169, at 751 (noting
first Daubert factor); see also Stanczyk v. Black & Decker, 836 F. Supp. 565, 567 (N.D.
Ill. 1993) (excluding testimony when expert witness "offered no testable design to
support his concept").
177. For a discussion of empirical testing of FBS, see supra notes 71-105 and
accompanying text.
29
Chuk: It's (Not) Bad, It's (Not) Bad, You Know It: The Growing Acceptan
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2009
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
ing methodology is "testable" and subject to further analysis. 178 Tests have
analyzed the FBS across a wide variety of settings including PTSD victims,
compensation-seeking litigation, and workplace injuries. 179 Nearly all of
these scales support the validity of the FBS. °80 Tests criticizing the FBS
were challenged as erroneous, particularly amongst the groups FBS was
designed to test.' 8 1 Additionally, the MMPI-2, which incorporates the
FBS, usually passes this part of a Daubert motion, although "as judges may
lack the technical knowledge to assess MMPI-2 evidence, decisions of ad-
missibility are not as predictable.' 8 2 While the FBS, on its own, has a
sufficient body to support its use, "[t] he MMPI and MMPI-2 have been the
subject of literally thousands of psychological research studies, many of
which are reported in peer-reviewed journals.1 8 3 When FBS testing is
considered in conjunction with MMPI testing, the FBS clearly fulfills the
first criterion suggested in Daubert.1
84
Daubert's second criterion is that the testing must peer reviewed and
published.1 85 Testing of the FBS appears in nearly a dozen psychological
journals.' 8 6 Though FBS testing appears in fewer journals than MMPI
178. For a discussion of criterion testing of FBS, see supra note 54 and accom-
panying text.
179. See, e.g., Crawford et al., supra note 8, at 217-21 (finding that FBS was
only MMPI measure that produced significant correlation with respect to malin-
gering and workplace injuries); Greiffenstein, supra note 78, at 1591-92 (recogniz-
ing FBS's success in detecting malingering among compensation-seeking litigants);
Nelson et al., supra note 77, at 1-12 (recognizing FBS' effectiveness in spotting
feigned PTSD).
180. For a discussion of peer reviewed testing of FBS, see supra notes 71-105
and accompanying text.
181. See Armstrong, supra note 4 (discussing responses to studies criticizing
FBS). For a discussion of tests criticizing FBS, see supra notes 72-75 and accompa-
nying text.
182. See Pennuto, supra note 52, at 375 (noting that MMPI is still not one
hundred percent understood in court); see also Chrissafis v. Continental Airlines,
No. 95 C 5080, 1997 WL 534874, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 1997) (stating that "it
appears that the MMPI-2 satisfies the requirements of Daubert").
183. See Brief for Defendant at *6, Stokes v. Xerox Corp, No. 05-71683, 2008
WL 275672 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 28, 2008) (discussing amount of review given to FBS);
see also Pennuto, supra note 52, at 356 (stating "[t]housands of research studies
have been performed on the MMPI-2 measure itself").
184. For discussion of the first criterion of Daubert, see supra notes 176-83 and
accompanying text.
185. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (stating
that "[a]nother pertinent consideration is whether the theory or technique has
been subjected to peer review and publication"). According to Daubert, peer re-
view means "that a given study, methodology, or result will be, in most cases, more
reliable than unpublished studies." Matthew W. Swinehart, Note, Remedying
Daubert's Inadequacy in Evaluating the Admissibility of Scientific Models Used in Environ-
mental-Tort Litigation, 86 TEX. L. REv. 1281, 1306 (2008). The peer review require-
ment "bridge[s] the competency divide between the scientific and legal realms...
by relying in part on peer review to vet potential expert-witness testimony." Id.
186. See Brief for Defendant supra note 183, at *6 (explaining peer reviewed
studies of FBS).
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testing, this is likely attributed to the relative novelty of the test.1 8 7 Daubert
states,
[s] ome propositions, moreover, are too particular, too new, or of
too limited interest to be published. But submission to the scru-
tiny of the scientific community is a component of 'good sci-
ence,' in part because it increases the likelihood that substantive
flaws in methodology will be detected.'
88
In accordance with this criterion, the FBS was subjected to methodology
designed to detect such flaws, and outlined in a variety of publications. 189
The third non-exclusive factor in Daubert calls for a known rate of
error. 190 In his initial FBS study, Dr. Lees-Haley determined that an FBS
score of twenty correctly "classified 96% of personal injury claimants diag-
nosed as malingering emotional distress as malingers and . . . 90%, of
personal injury claimants diagnosed as presenting genuine injuries as
nonmalingers." 19 1 One study was designed to gather error rate informa-
tion subjected the FBS to a validity index. 192 The data showed that "[i]n a
group of knowledgeable actors (malingerers), 86% [were] correctly classi-
fied."193 The FBS contains a very low error rate, but not even a high error
rate could successfully eliminate the admissibility of the FBS under
Daubert. 1
94
The fourth and final Daubert criterion calls for "general acceptance,"
which is also the lone requirement in Frye.195 Thus, if the FBS satisfies this
187. Compare Armstrong, supra note 4 (noting novelty of FBS), with Pennuto,
supra note 52, at 356 (stating that "[t]housands of research studies have been per-
formed on the MMPI-2 measure itself").
188. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94 (discussing need for peer reviewed testing).
189. For a discussion of FBS testing in peer reviewed journals, see supra notes
71-105 and accompanying text.
190. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 ("Additionally, in the case of a particular
scientific technique, the court ordinarily should consider the known or potential
rate of error."). In Daubert's third factor, courts can "choose to admit only models
that succeeded in meeting a certain minimum degree 'fit' with reality." Swinehart,
supra note 185, at 1308. An error rate, however, can "never be absolutely accurate
and will have some nonzero rate of error." Id.
191. Meyers et al., supra note 31, at 157-69 (discussing error rate in initial
study of FBS).
192. See generally id. (creating validity index for MMPI-2 scales including FBS).
The validity index the author used to study the FBS "has been studied with many
different samples and conditions" including both "fake bad (exaggerated impair-
ment)" and "fake good (trying to appear as not having any emotional distress or
problems)" scales. See id. at 158 (noting effectiveness of validity index used to ana-
lyze FBS).
193. Id. at 157 (discussing study results).
194. See, e.g., United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 560 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating
that "error rate is only one in a list of nonexclusive factors that the Daubert court
observed would bear on the admissibility question").
195. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95 (stating "general acceptance" is relevant to
the expert inquiry). Daubert keeps Frye's general acceptance test relevant:
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prong, it succeeds under both the Fye and Daubert tests. 196 At least eleven
articles support the use of FBS. 19 7 The Wall Street Journal noted that "the
Fake Bad Scale has been used by 75% of neuropsychologists, who regularly
appear in court as expert witnesses." 198 The same study cited by the Wall
Street Journal further opines that forty-three percent of psychologists "al-
ways use" the FBS. 19 9 The study states "the results of this current study
indicate frequently used measures [like the FBS] . . . would all meet Frye
standards for admissibility as approximately three-quarters of the sample
surveyed stated that they used these measures to detect suboptimal effort."
200 Further, the MMPI-2, which endorses the FBS, "is the most researched
psychological assessment administered." 20 1 The MMPI has been subject
to thousands of research studies and is "by far, common of all the psycho-
logical assessments employed. '20 2 Thus, in fulfilling the fourth factor, the
General acceptance is not a necessary precondition to the admissibility of
scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence, but the Rules of
Evidence-kespecially Rule 702-do assign to the trial judge the task of
ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation
and is relevant to the task at hand. Pertinent evidence based on scientifi-
cally valid principles will satisfy those demands.
Id.
196. See id. at 594 (discussing general acceptance criterion). Although Frye
requires "general acceptance" and Daubert does not, Daubert holds that general ac-
ceptance "can yet have a bearing on the inquiry." See id. (recognizing value in
general acceptance inquiry). Though none of Daubert's four factors are singularly
determinative, some states have indicated that "even under the Daubert standard
... the general acceptance inquiry of Frye may be considered determinative . . .
[because the Court's] philosophy is that, if a scientific technique has achieved gen-
eral acceptance in the relevant scientific community, no further inquiry under the
Daubert standard is necessary." Jensen, supra note 17, at 1616 (discussing impor-
tance of "general acceptance" factor) (footnote omitted). Further, other states
using Daubert criteria "appear to give great weight to the general acceptance stan-
dard of Frye' even if they do not consider it determinative. Id. at 1617.
197. See Press Release, Pearson Assessments, supra note 9 (listing studies men-
tioning FBS).
198. See Armstrong, supra note 4 (noting prevalence of FBS amongst practic-
ing neuropsychologists).
199. See generally Sharland & Gfeller, supra note 72, at 213-23 (referencing
same study cited by Wall Street Journal, stating that FBS is regularly used by practic-
ing clinicians); see also Reiner v. Warren Resort Hotels, Inc., No. 06-173-M-DWM,
2008 WL 5120682, at *15, (D. Mont. Oct. 1, 2008) (stating that FBS is "recognized
as valid within the neuropsychology profession" and is not "so unreliable that the
Court should exclude any opinion testimony relying on them").
200. See Sharland & Gfeller, supra note 72, at 221 (predicting FBS will survive
Frye motions); see also Pennuto, supra note 52, at 354 (discussing frequent studies
done to MMPI).
201. See id. at 356 (stating MMPI-2 "has been used in over ten thousand re-
search studies" and that "[mi] any studies involve the use of the MMPI-2 as a person-
ality assessment measure"). Further, the MMPI itself has been the subject of
"thousands of research studies." See id. (recognizing large body of MMPI-2
testing).
202. See id. at 353 (noting general acceptance of MMPI-2).
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FBS satisfies both Frye and Daubert.203 Because Dr. Griffith was clearly
qualified as an expert, and based upon his credentials which were men-
tioned on the record, if the same factual scenario had occurred in a differ-
ent court using Frye or Daubert, the same evidence would likely be
allowed.
20 4
This is not to say that defendants such as KBR automatically win their
cases if FBS evidence is introduced. 205 As previously mentioned, the FBS
is not a substitute for the adversarial process, and Daubert and its progeny
still allow for judicial tactics by plaintiffs. 20 6 In Daubert, the Supreme
Court stated that "[v] igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the tradi-
tional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evi-
dence." 20 7 Even if plaintiff's lawyers find that this evidence is "shaky," the
case is not all lost.20 8 Daubert envisioned judges only as "gatekeepers," but
cases will still be decided by the trier of fact.
20 9
VI. IMPACT
Most scholarship regarding the FBS, both in and out of the legal
world, is written by those who already have a financial stake in the mat-
ter.210 Dr. Lees-Haley, the creator of the FBS, works as an expert witness
203. For a discussion of FBS under Frye and Daubert standards, see supra notes
161-202 and accompanying text.
204. See S.T. v. KBR, Case No. 2007-LDA-11, 1, 25 (A.L.J., Dep't of Labor Oct.
23, 2007), http://www.oalj.dol.gov/Decisions/ALJ/LDA/2007/ST-v-KBRGOV
ERNMENTOPERA_2007LDAOOO11_(OCT 23 2007)_081915_CADECSD.PDF
(stating that Dr. Griffith is "highly credentialed", and "has been involved in over
100 PTSD cases for treatment and forensic endeavors").
205. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) (noting
that "shaky but admissible evidence", such as expert testimony, can be overcome by
"[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful in-
struction on the burden of proof").
206. See id. (noting that expert evidence is still weighed by trier of fact).
Daubert states if the trial court determines "that the scintilla of evidence presented
supporting a position is insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that
the position more likely than not is true, the court remains free to direct a judg-
ment . . . [or] grant summary judgment." Id. (discussing judicial remedies for
unreliable expert evidence).
207. Id. (noting alternatives for parties challenging evidence).
208. See id. (stating that respondent was "overly pessimistic" because tactics
still exist to contradict "shaky but admissible evidence").
209. See id. at 580 (explaining that goal of Daubert is to "assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine the fact in issue"); see also, e.g., Reiner
v. Warren Resort Hotels, Inc., No. 06-173-M-DWM, 2008 WL 5120682, at *15 (D.
Mont. Oct. 1, 2008) (noting that plaintiff's objections to FBS relate to "the weight,
and not the admissibility" of evidence).
210. See, e.g., Armstrong, supra note 4 (stating that working with litigants is
Lees-Haley's "main source of income"). Lees-Hayley charges $600 per hour as an
expert witness. See Scheffey, supra note 10, at 3 (discussing Lees-Haley's salary).
Dorothy Sims, who authored of a number of pieces criticizing FBS, and is a self
proclaimed "expert" on the FBS, is a Florida-barred plaintiffs attorney. See id. (in-
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for large corporations like KBR.2 11 Thus, if the FBS is deemed legitimate
in court, he serves to profit from it.212 Conversely, of the several articles
available in legal journals criticizing the FBS, nearly all are penned by
plaintiffs attorneys, who certainly have a financial interest in seeing the
FBS discredited.
2 13
Despite competing motivations, the FBS is well grounded in empirical
evidence, and further, the MMPI's endorsement of the FBS should act as a
seal of approval in the legal world. 214 The authors of the MMPI, who
shared many of the courts' concerns regarding the efficiency of the test,
added the test to the approved materials following expert evaluations.
2 15
The MMPI authors were correct to recognize the FBS is not a "truth se-
rum" or a judicial cure-all. 2 16 The FBS is simply one tool, when used in
conjunction with others, that helps to determine whether a plaintiff is fak-
ing or exaggerating; the court in S.T. v. KBR recognized this utility.
2 17
Thus, because the FBS can assist the trier of fact, and passes Frye and
Daubert standards, it has a place in our courtrooms.
218
Stephen R. Chuk
terviewing Sims); Sims, supra note 10, at 1 (highlighting Sims's critical view of FBS
in self-authored piece).
211. See Armstrong, supra note 4 (noting that Lees-Haley charged "$3,500 to
evaluate a claimant and $600 an hour for depositions and court appearances").
212. See id. (same).
213. See, e.g., American Contractors in Iraq, http://www.americancontractor-
siniraq.com/files/ALLMalingering-articles.pdf (last visted Sept. 22, 2009) (listing
several malingering articles written by Florida plaintiff's attorney).
214. For a discussion of the MMPI and empirical testing, see supra notes 52-62
and accompanying text.
215. See Press Release, Pearson Assessments, supra note 9 (announcing addi-
tion of FBS to MMPI-2 after considering "any information [the panel] cared to
[consider]").
216. See id. (noting that FBS is not error-proof). The panel approved the FBS,
stating:
[A]s is the case with all other MMPI-2 validity scales, scores on the FBS
should be considered in the context of scores on the other validity scales,
the circumstances of the assessment, and any conditions such as signifi-
cant physical injury or disease that could artificially elevate scores on the
FBS.
Id.
217. For a discussion of S. T. v. KBR, see supra notes 106-52 and accompanying
text.
218. For a discussion of S.T. v. KBR, see supra notes 106-52 and accompanying
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